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Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power 
John Yoo∗ 
Along with George Washington and Abraham Lincoln, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt is considered by most scholars to be one of 
our nation’s greatest presidents. FDR confronted challenges 
simultaneously that his predecessors had faced individually. 
Washington guided the nation’s founding when doubts arose as 
to whether Americans could establish an effective government. 
FDR radically re-engineered the government into the modern 
administrative state when Americans doubted whether their 
government could provide them with economic security. Lincoln 
saved the country from the greatest threat to its national 
security, leading it through a war that cost more American lives 
than any other. FDR led a reluctant nation against perhaps its 
most dangerous foreign foe—an alliance of fascist powers that 
threatened to place Europe and Asia under totalitarian 
dictatorships. To bring the nation through both crises, FDR drew 
deeply upon the reservoir of executive power unlike any 
president before or since—reflected in his unique status as the 
only chief executive to break the two-term tradition.1 
 
 ∗  Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise 
Institute. Thanks to Jeffrey Senning for outstanding research assistance. 
 1 There are a great number of works on Roosevelt, with more appearing all the 
time. I have relied on general works for the background to this chapter. See generally 
JOHN YOO & JULIAN KU, TAMING GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2012); CONRAD BACK, FRANKLIN DELANO 
ROOSEVELT: CHAMPION OF FREEDOM (2003); 1 JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: 
THE LION AND THE FOX 1882–1940 (1956); JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: 
SOLDIER OF FREEDOM (1970); KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: THE BECKONING OF DESTINY 1882–
1928 (2004); FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 
(1991); GEORGE MCJIMSEY, THE PRESIDENCY OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT (2000); 1 
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER 1919–1933 (1957); ARTHUR 
M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 1933–1935 
(1958); 3 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF 
UPHEAVAL (1960); GEOFFREY C. WARD, A FIRST-CLASS TEMPERAMENT: THE EMERGENCE 
OF FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT (1989). Similarly, there are a multitude of works on the New 
Deal. Some that have been particularly helpful are ALAN BRINKLEY, VOICES OF PROTEST: 
HUEY LONG, FATHER COUGHLIN, & THE GREAT DEPRESSION (1983); ALAN BRINKLEY, THE 
END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR (1996); BARRY CUSHMAN, 
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 
(1998); DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION 
AND WAR, 1929–1945 (1999); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
AND THE NEW DEAL 1932–1940 (1963); SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE 
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FDR came to office in the midst of the gravest challenges to 
the nation since the Civil War. The most obvious and immediate 
crisis was the Great Depression. FDR placed the president in the 
role of a legislative leader and produced a dramatic restructuring 
of the national government, even though the Depression, as a 
breakdown of the domestic (and global) economy, fell within the 
constitutional authority of Congress. Large Democratic majorities 
in Congress expanded federal regulation of the economy beyond 
anything before seen in peacetime. Regulation of prices and 
supply, product quality, wages and working conditions, the 
securities markets, and pensions became commonplace where they 
had once been rare. Social Security was not just one of the 
New Deal’s most important planks, but an expression of the 
whole platform. 
The federal government would declare responsibility to 
coordinate and regulate economic activity to provide stability. It 
had always exercised broad economic powers during wartime, but 
FDR made management of the economy by a bureaucracy of 
experts a permanent feature of American life. While the 
Republican presidents who had dominated elections since the 
Civil War had left economic decisions to the market, FDR pushed 
the federal government to provide for economic as well as 
national security. 
FDR’s revolution radically shifted the balance of power 
among the three branches of government, as well as between the 
nation and the states. Under the New Deal, Congress delegated 
to the executive branch the discretion to make the many 
decisions necessary to regulate the economy. Congress did not 
have the time, organization, or expertise to make the minute 
decisions required. The New Deal did not just produce a federal 
government of broad power—it gave birth to a president whose 
influence over domestic affairs would expand to match his role in 
foreign affairs. When the Supreme Court stood in the way of the 
new administrative state, FDR launched a campaign to increase 
the membership of the Court to change the meaning of the 
Constitution. When political parties challenged the New Deal, 
FDR concentrated power in the executive branch, which 
undermined their ability to channel benefits to their members. 
The New Deal produced a presidency that was more 
institutionally independent of Congress and more politically free 
of the parties than ever before.2 
 
PARTIES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM SINCE THE NEW DEAL 
(1993); and G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000). 
 2 See, e.g., MILKIS, supra note 1, at 98–124; THEODORE J. LOWI, THE PERSONAL 
PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE UNFULFILLED (1985). 
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The Great Depression spawned foreign threats, too. 
Economic instability in Europe set the conditions for the rise of 
fascism first in Italy, then in Germany and Japan. Roosevelt 
realized early that American interests would be best served by 
supporting the democracies against the Axis powers, but he was 
confronted by a nation wary of another foreign war and a 
Congress determined to impose strict neutrality. FDR used every 
last inch of presidential power to bring the nation into the war on 
the side of the Allies, including secretly coordinating military 
activities with Britain, attempting to force an incident with 
Germany in the North Atlantic, and pressuring Japan until it 
lashed out in the Pacific. FDR’s steady leadership in the face of 
stiff congressional resistance stands as one of the greatest 
examples of presidential leadership in the last century, one that 
redounded to the benefit of the United States and the free world. 
This Article will review FDR’s approach to executive power 
by examining three dimensions of his presidency: domestic 
policy, foreign policy, and civil liberties in wartime. First, it will 
examine FDR’s expansion of presidential power by leading 
Congress, in the throes of the Great Depression, to create a vast 
administrative state. He followed with a claim of presidential 
independence in interpreting the Constitution, which he enforced 
with a Court-packing plan that eventually forced the Justices to 
agree. As the administrative state grew in leaps and bounds, 
FDR expanded the power of the White House in a failing effort to 
maintain centralized, rational control of the bureaucracy. Second, 
it will examine FDR’s aggressive use of executive authority to 
face the rise of Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. FDR 
stretched existing laws barring U.S. involvement in World War II 
to the breaking point, and then went even further with claims of 
sole executive power to assist the Allies. Third, this Article will 
examine FDR’s attitude toward civil liberties in wartime by 
focusing on three decisions: the use of military commissions to try 
Nazi saboteurs, the internment of Japanese-American citizens, 
and the widespread interception of electronic communications. 
FDR had a vision of the office in keeping with his great 
predecessors, Washington and Jefferson. He took full advantage 
of the independence of the presidency and vigorously exercised 
its constitutional authorities. In order to respond to crises, both 
in peace and war, he contested the Constitution’s meaning with 
the other branches of government. He challenged the Supreme 
Court’s effort to stop the New Deal with his Court-packing plan. 
To meet the rise of Germany and Japan, he relied on a robust 
reading of the Commander-in-Chief power—even if it meant 
ignoring the Neutrality Acts—to bring the United States into the 
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war. FDR understood Berlin and Tokyo’s existential threat. He 
would set the example for the Cold War presidents to follow in 
both managing the vast regulatory state at home and meeting 
the challenges of dire threats abroad. 
I. THE NEW DEAL AND THE COURTS 
FDR entered office in the midst of the worst economic 
contraction in American history. Between the summer of 1929 
and the spring of 1933, nominal gross national product dropped 
by fifty percent.3 Prices for all goods fell by about a third; income 
from agriculture collapsed from $6 billion to $2 billion; industrial 
production declined by thirty-seven percent;4 and business 
investment plummeted from $24 billion to $3 billion. About one-
quarter of the workforce, thirteen million Americans, remained 
consistently unemployed, and the unemployment rate would 
remain above fifteen percent for the rest of the decade.5 More 
than 5000 banks failed, with a loss of $7 billion in deposits.6 
From the time of the crash in October 1929 to its low in 
July 1932, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell more than 
seventy-five percent.7 It was not a problem caused by famine or 
drought, dwindling natural resources, or crippled production; 
crops spoiled and livestock were destroyed because market prices 
were too low. 
Americans were losing faith in their political institutions to 
solve the crisis. Though the causes of the Depression were 
complex, some (FDR included) blamed “economic royalists,” 
financiers and speculators, and the rich. Economists and 
historians have argued ever since over the causes of the 
Depression. Little evidence seems to support the claim that the 
stock market crash triggered the Depression—stock markets 
have sharply declined since then, most recently in 1987, with no 
underlying change in economic growth. 
 
 3 See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES 1867–1960, at 299–301 (1963). 
 4 Id. at 301. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 317, 330. 
 7 To understand the economics of the Great Depression and the New Deal, see 1 
ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, 1913–1951 (2003); Peter 
Temin, The Great Depression, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 301 (Stanley Engerman & Robert Gallman, eds., 2000); THOMAS E. HALL & J. 
DAVID FERGUSON, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: AN INTERNATIONAL DISASTER OF PERVERSE 
ECONOMIC POLICIES (1998); RICHARD K. VEDDER & LOWELL E. GALLAWAY, OUT OF WORK: 
UNEMPLOYMENT AND GOVERNMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (N.Y. Univ. Press 
rev. ed. 1997); BARRY EICHENGREEN, GOLDEN FETTERS: THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE 
GREAT DEPRESSION, 1919–1939 (1995); and FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 299–
301. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 (2d ed. 1988), remains a classic 
treatment, but one that has been surpassed by more recent work. 
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In their classic Monetary History of the United States, Milton 
Friedman and Anna Schwartz argued that a normal recession 
deepened into the Great Depression because the Federal Reserve 
mistakenly responded to the banking panic by restricting the 
money supply.8 A deflation in prices followed, which led to a 
steep drop in economic activity. Ben Bernanke, the current 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, elaborated on this theme by 
arguing that the Fed’s deflationary banking policies tightened 
the credit available to businesses and households, further 
suppressing economic activity.9 Others argue that the Great 
Depression must be understood within the context of the 
international economy, which witnessed bank failures and 
recession in Germany and France, defaults on World War I loan 
and reparation payments, abandonment of the gold standard, 
and the dumping of agricultural products on world markets. 
While our understanding of the Great Depression has 
improved thanks to the scholarship of the last forty years, a clear 
consensus of its causes has yet to emerge. Unsurprisingly then, 
to the Americans who lived through it, the collapse of the 
economy was bewildering, confusing, and without precedent. The 
Hoover administration’s policies did not help and might have 
made matters even worse. As historians have realized, Hoover 
did not adopt the aloof, hands-off attitude that his political 
opponents charged. During his administration, Congress doubled 
public works spending, and the federal budget deficit rose to $2.7 
billion, at that time the largest in American peacetime history. 
He pressed business executives to maintain employment and 
wages, and experimented with policies, such as the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation’s emergency loans to businesses, which 
would set important examples for the New Dealers.10 
But Hoover’s initiatives were mere stopgaps that were 
swamped by other policy mistakes. Though he had initially asked 
for tariff reductions, Hoover signed the notorious Smoot-Hawley 
Act, which raised rates and killed international trade flows. 
Following the conventional economic wisdom of the day, Hoover 
sought to balance the budget with tax increases at a time when 
the economy needed fiscal stimulus. As Milton Friedman and 
Allan Meltzer have separately argued, the Federal Reserve 
pursued a deflationary strategy, cutting off the economy’s 
oxygen, when increases in the money supply were called for.11  
 
 8 FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 240–42. 
 9 BEN S. BERNANKE, ESSAYS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION 51 (2000). 
 10 KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 164–65. 
 11 See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 299–301; MELTZER, supra note 7, 
at 271. 
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Some of Hoover’s failure stems from his vision of the 
presidency. As president, he refused to assume the role of 
legislative leader, resisted the expansion of the federal agencies, 
and opposed national welfare legislation—all on constitutional 
grounds.12 FDR’s vision of the office could not have created a 
sharper contrast. FDR led the nation through a frenzy of 
experimentation in policies and government structure without 
parallel in American history. There appeared to be no 
comprehensive philosophy behind the New Deal, which comes as 
little surprise, given the confusion that prevailed at the time over 
the causes of the Depression.  
Without any true understanding of the reasons for the 
collapse, the New Dealers tried anything and everything. 
Thinking that overproduction was the culprit, some 
recommended the cartelization of industries to reduce supply and 
increase prices. Others who blamed under-consumption 
advocated public jobs programs and welfare relief. Some believed 
that the budget deficit was the problem, and urged an increase in 
taxes and cuts in spending. Some thought international trade 
was a cause, and advocated both more flexibility in trade 
negotiations and the dumping of excess agricultural production 
overseas. Pragmatic and political (he had been a professional 
politician for most of his life), and unsure about the true causes 
of the Depression, Roosevelt flittered from idea to idea. Some had 
the effect of canceling each other out—public works projects 
sponsored by the National Recovery Administration had to buy 
raw materials at prices inflated by controls imposed by the 
Department of Agriculture. 
Throughout all the experimentation and expansion of 
government, the one thing that did not change was the focus on 
the presidency. FDR became the father of the modern presidency 
by moving the chief executive to the center of the American 
political universe. FDR drafted the executive’s wartime powers 
into peacetime service, but without calling for any formal change 
in the Constitution. In his First Inaugural Address, he declared 
that “our Constitution is so simple and practical that it is 
possible always to meet extraordinary needs by changes in 
emphasis and arrangement without loss of essential form.”13 
What FDR wanted was access to the constitutional powers 
granted to the president during time of emergency. He promised 
 
 12 Ellis W. Hawley, The Constitution of the Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt 
Presidency During the Depression Era, 1930–1939, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 83, 90–91 (Martin Fausold & Alan Shank eds., 1991).  
 13 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 15 (Samuel I. 
Rosenman ed., 1938). 
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to seek from Congress “broad executive power to wage a war 
against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given 
me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”14 FDR’s expansion 
of the powers of the presidency, both political and constitutional, 
would grow from this basic theme—the economy and society 
would henceforth be regulated in ways that were once considered 
suitable only for war. 
The nation got a taste of what FDR meant when, on his 
second day in office, he issued the second emergency 
proclamation in American history. During the period between 
FDR’s election and his inauguration, a massive run on banks had 
forced many to close their doors or stop lending. Invoking the 
Trading with the Enemy Act,15 FDR imposed a national banking 
holiday and prohibited all gold transactions.16 Roosevelt’s use of 
the Act was questionable, to say the least. Congress had passed 
the Act in 1917 to give the president broad economic powers 
during wartime or national emergency, but not to regulate the 
domestic economy in the absence of a foreign threat. Without the 
statute, FDR was left to act under an unspecified presidential 
emergency power. At the end of the banking moratorium, 
Congress convened in special session and passed the Emergency 
Banking Act, which gave the federal government powers to 
control gold and currency transactions, to own stock in banks, 
and to regulate the re-opening of the banks.17 Because the 
Roosevelt administration had only finished drafting the 
legislation the night before, a rolled-up newspaper substituted as 
a prop for an actual copy of the bill’s text, and the House spent 
only thirty minutes discussing the legislation. 
Roosevelt set a precedent for his successors by rushing a 
torrent of legislation through Congress in his first 100 days. The 
National Industrial Recovery Act (“NRA”), the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act (“AAA”), the Emergency Banking Act, the 
Emergency Railroad Transportation Act (“ERTA”), and the Home 
Owners Loan Act (“HOLA”) all granted FDR extraordinary 
economic powers to fight the Depression. Their enactment 
signaled the breakdown of the previously sharp distinction 
between the executive and legislative branches. The executive 
branch took the primary responsibility for drafting bills, 
Congress passed them quickly with minimum deliberation 
 
 14 Id. 
 15 Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. §5 (2000). 
 16 Robert Jabaily, Bank Holiday of 1933, FEDERAL RESERVE HISTORY 
(Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/bank_holiday_of_1933 
[http://perma.cc/PQN4-UDFU]. 
 17 Emergency Banking Relief Act of 1933, Pub. L. 1, 48 Stat. 1. 
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(sometimes sight unseen), and the laws themselves delegated 
broad authority to the president or the administrative agencies.18 
Through the agencies, the executive branch would impose an 
unprecedented level of centralized planning over the peacetime 
economy. The AAA, for example, gave the executive the power to 
dictate which crops were to be planted.19 Under the NRA, 
agencies enacted industry-wide codes of conduct, usually drafted 
by the industries themselves, to govern production and 
employment.20 New Dealers sought to address falling prices for 
commodities by setting higher prices, reducing competition, and 
limiting production.21 
Little attention was given to constitutional problems with 
the legislation, which threatened to exceed the Supreme Court’s 
limitations on federal power. Laws like the NRA or the AAA 
pressed the Constitution’s grant of authority to Congress to make 
laws “to regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”22 
Other laws, such as the new public employment and 
unemployment relief programs, raised constitutional issues 
about the national government’s taxing and spending authority, 
but again these were only problems of federalism, not of 
presidential power. They mirrored the steps that the national 
government had taken to mobilize the economy for military 
production while reducing domestic consumption—many of the 
early programs of the New Deal were modeled on World War I 
efforts. As William Leuchtenburg has observed, war became a 
metaphor for the calamity brought on by the Depression, and 
FDR and his advisers turned to their wartime experience for 
solutions.23 “Almost every New Deal act or agency derived, to 
some extent, from the experience of World War I.”24 
FDR’s legislative whirlwind set in motion a series of events 
that culminated in confrontation with the Supreme Court. Even 
though the President would suffer politically and 
constitutionally, he would eventually prevail. The roots of the 
conflict stretched back to the Progressive Era, when the Justices 
held that the Interstate Commerce Clause did not allow 
regulation of manufacturing or agriculture within a state. Under 
the theory of dual federalism, the Court blocked antitrust 
 
 18 HAWLEY, supra note 12, at 92. 
 19 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 7 U.S.C. ch. 26, § 601 et seq. 
 20 HALL & FERGUSON, supra note 7, at 124. 
 21 Id. at 124–26. 
 22 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
 23 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE FDR YEARS: ON ROOSEVELT AND HIS LEGACY 
41–53 (1995). 
 24 Id. at 53. 
Do Not Delete 3/5/18 1:46 PM 
2018] Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power 213 
enforcement against a sugar-refining monopoly in 1895 because 
the refining itself did not cross interstate lines.25 In 1918, it held 
unconstitutional a federal law that prohibited the interstate 
transportation of goods made with child labor.26 Even though the 
federal ban applied only when the product moved across state 
lines, the Court held that “the production of articles, intended for 
interstate commerce, is a matter of local regulation.”27 When 
Congress attacked child labor again with a ten percent excise tax, 
the Court blocked that too, on the ground that Congress could not 
use a tax to achieve a prohibited end.28 
The Court matched its limits on federal authority to regulate 
the economy with similar restrictions on the states. Where 
Congress could only exercise the powers carefully enumerated in 
Article I, states enjoyed a general “police power” over all conduct 
within their borders. The courts, however, read the Fourteenth 
Amendment—which forbids states from depriving individuals of 
life, liberty, or property without due process29—to block a great 
deal of state business regulation. In Lochner v. New York, the 
Court struck down a state law that prohibited bakers from 
working more than sixty hours a week or ten hours per day.30 
According to the majority, the Constitution protected the bakers’ 
individual right to contract to work as much as they liked.31 The 
state could not adopt economic legislation to redistribute income 
within the industry (the law favored established bakeries at the 
expense of immigrant bakers), or infringe the rights of free 
labor.32 In dissent, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously 
accused the majority of following its preferences rather than the 
law.33 “[A] Constitution is not intended to embody a particular 
economic theory, whether of paternalism . . . or of laissez faire,” 
Holmes memorably wrote.34 “The Fourteenth Amendment does 
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”35 From the time 
of Lochner to the New Deal, the Court invalidated 184 state laws 
governing working hours and wages, organized labor, commodity 
prices, and entry into business.36 
 
 25 See United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1895).  
 26 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918). 
 27 Id. at 272, 276. 
 28 See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 35–36, 43–44 (1922). 
 29 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 30 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). 
 31 Id. at 64. 
 32 Id. at 62. 
 33 Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 271, 311 (1932) (striking 
down a state legislative bar requiring a demonstration of necessity for licensing and 
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Legislation enacted during FDR’s first 100 days in office 
virtually dared the Justices to block the New Deal. The NRA did 
not just attempt to ban a single product or manufacturing 
process—it placed all industrial production in the nation under 
federal regulation. The AAA did the same with agriculture, and 
another law with coal mining. Laws passed later in FDR’s term, 
such as the National Labor Relations Act and the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act, set nationwide rules on unions and 
utilities, while the Social Security Act created a universal system 
of unemployment compensation and old age pension.37 
FDR was following in the footsteps of presidents who dared 
to interpret the Constitution at odds with the other branches. 
FDR himself appeared to have held few constitutional doubts. 
New Deal theorists believed, for example, that the Interstate 
Commerce Clause pertained to almost all economic activity in the 
nation because all goods manufactured or grown within a state 
traveled through the channels of interstate commerce to reach 
the market.38 While the federal government might usually defer 
to the states on many matters, the Depression was so grave that 
the states were powerless to control a nationwide problem. 
Roosevelt recognized early on that his program risked 
antagonizing the federal courts, which were filled with 
Republican judges.39 He could count on the opposition of Justices 
James McReynolds, Willis Van Devanter, George Sutherland, 
and Pierce Butler, known as “The Four Horsemen,”40 for their 
skepticism toward government regulation of the economy and 
their defense of individual economic rights. But FDR believed he 
could expect the general support of progressives Justices Louis 
Brandeis, Harlan Fiske Stone, and Benjamin Cardozo. Chief 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Justice Owen Roberts held 
the swing votes. FDR hoped that the Court would grant the 
political branches more constitutional leeway to respond to the 
 
business entry); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 239 (1929) (finding 
legislature may not authorize state agencies to set gasoline prices sold in the state); 
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 560 (1923) (finding state mandated minimum 
wages, for women and children, interfered with an individual’s constitutional liberty to 
contract); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (holding a federal labor law 
prohibiting employee termination or discrimination based on labor organization 
membership unconstitutional); JESSE H. CHOPER, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – CASES, 
COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 292 (9th ed. 2001). 
37 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (1935); Public Utility Holding 
Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1935); Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7 (1935). 
 38 Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933–1946, 59 
HARV. L. REV. 645, 683 (1946). 
 39 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 83–84 (1995). 
 40 Id. at 3. 
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national crisis of the Great Depression. In previous national 
security emergencies, the courts had allowed the federal 
government to mobilize the economy with little objection. FDR 
had reason for these hopes in early 1934, after 5–4 majorities of 
the Court upheld state laws setting milk prices and delaying 
mortgage payments.41 
Those hopes were dashed with the opening of the Court’s 
business in January 1935. In its first case examining a New Deal 
law, an 8–1 majority of the Court invalidated the NRA’s “hot oil” 
provision, which allowed the executive branch to prohibit the 
interstate transportation of petroleum produced in violation of 
quotas.42 Chief Justice Hughes wrote that the provision 
unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the president.43 
That decision was only a preview to May 27, 1935—known as 
“Black Monday” to New Dealers44—when the Court struck down 
three New Deal laws. The centerpiece was the Court’s 
unanimous rejection of the NRA in the “Sick Chicken” case, 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. United States, in which the owners of 
a chicken slaughterhouse were prosecuted for violating industrial 
codes of conduct.45 
In finding the NRA unconstitutional, the Justices threatened 
the two core features of the New Deal. Schechter Poultry held 
that the Constitution prohibited Congress from delegating 
legislative power to the president, especially when rulemaking 
authority was then sub-delegated to private industry groups.46 
The NRA also violated the Constitution’s limits on the reach of 
federal economic power.47 The owners of the slaughterhouse sold 
their chickens into a local market, which did not directly impact 
interstate commerce, even though a high percentage of chickens 
came from out of state. If the Court were to keep to its precedent 
that intra-state manufacturing and agriculture lay outside 
federal authority, more pillars of the New Deal—perhaps even 
the whole program itself—might collapse. In pointed language, 
the Court specifically rejected the Roosevelt administration’s 
overarching approach to the Great Depression: “Extraordinary 
conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power.”48 
 
 41 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425–28 (1934); see also 
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934). 
 42 Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 405, 433 (1935). 
 43 Id. at 431–33. 
 44 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 39, at 89. 
 45 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 508 (1935). 
 46 Id. at 550. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 528. 
Do Not Delete 3/5/18 1:46 PM 
216 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:1 
FDR responded with a political attack on the Court. In a 
ninety-minute press conference, the President declared Schechter 
Poultry to be the most significant judicial decision since Dred 
Scott.49 While critical of the Court’s ruling on executive power, he 
believed that those problems could be fixed by re-writing the 
statutes to give more direction and less delegation.50 It was 
Schechter’s narrow view of the Commerce Clause that posed the 
real threat to the New Deal. If Congress could not regulate the 
activities of the butchers because they were local in nature, it 
would be unable to police most other manufacturing or 
agricultural enterprises. “The whole tendency over these years 
has been to view the interstate commerce clause in the light of 
present-day civilization,” Roosevelt told the press. “We are 
interdependent—we are tied together.”51 To Roosevelt, the Justices’ 
way of thinking failed to take account of the national character of 
the economy. “We have been relegated to a horse-and-buggy 
definition of interstate commerce.”52 
FDR considered a variety of proposals if the Court were to 
continue ruling against the New Deal: increasing the number of 
Justices (giving the president enough new appointments to 
change the balance on the Court), reducing the Court’s 
jurisdiction, or requiring a supermajority of Justices to declare a 
federal law unconstitutional. He rejected them all as premature, 
but he had been prepared to respond to a potential rejection of 
the prohibition on gold transactions with a declaration of a 
national emergency, a fixed price for gold, and an attack on the 
Court for “imperil[ing] the economic and political security of this 
nation.”53 But the Court upheld the gold regulations, causing 
Roosevelt to shelve his plans.54 
The administration continued to work with Congress to 
expand federal intervention in the economy. Known as the 
Second New Deal, these laws went beyond the simple, sweeping 
delegations of authority to the president in the NRA or the AAA. 
New laws such as the National Labor Relations Act and the 
Social Security Act created specialized bureaucracies to handle 
discrete areas of economic regulation. While the First New Deal 
vested the president with emergency powers to handle the 
Depression, the Second New Deal of 1935–1936 promised 
 
 49 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note 13, 
at 221. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
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 53 William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's “Court-Packing” 
Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 351–54 (1966). 
 54 See Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 316 (1935). 
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permanent government intervention in the economy. One of 
FDR’s political achievements was to transform the social contract 
so that government benefits became understood as rights—rights 
just as real to many Americans as those in the Constitution 
itself. But they did nothing to avoid the constitutional problems 
of the First New Deal: Their very success depended on their 
ability to regulate all economic activity, rather than just trade 
that crossed interstate borders. 
The Court, however, stuck to its guns. Rather than cower 
before this second outburst of lawmaking, in the spring of 1936, 
it declared unconstitutional more elements of the New Deal. In 
United States v. Butler, the Court held unconstitutional the 
AAA’s use of taxes and grants to regulate agricultural 
production, which lay within the reserved powers of the states.55 
Butler threatened the Social Security Act, which used a 
combination of taxes and spending to provide relief and pensions 
to the unemployed and elderly. 
In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., a 5–4 majority struck down a 
1935 law that set prices, wages, hours, and collective bargaining 
rules for the coal industry.56 The Court found that the production 
of coal did not amount to interstate commerce, but instead fell 
within the reserved powers of the states.57 “[T]he effect of the 
labor provisions . . . primarily falls upon production and not upon 
commerce,” Justice Sutherland wrote for the majority.58 
“Production is a purely local activity.”59 Carter made clear that 
the sick chicken case was not a fluke; any federal regulation of 
intra-state industrial production or agriculture was now in 
constitutional doubt. In Jones v. SEC, the Justices attacked the 
proceedings of the Securities and Exchange Commission as 
“odious” and “pernicious” and compared it to the “intolerable 
abuses of the Star Chamber.”60 Morehead v. Tipaldo held that 
New York’s minimum wage law violated the Due Process Clause, 
just as it had earlier found that such laws interfered with the 
right to contract.61 As the Court had already found a federal 
minimum wage in the District of Columbia unconstitutional 
in the 1920s, it had made the regulation of wages, in FDR’s 
words, a “no-man’s land” forbidden to both the federal and 
state governments. 
 
 55 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936). 
 56 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 316–17 (1936). 
 57 Id. at 303. 
 58 Id. at 304. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Jones v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 298 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1936). 
 61 Morehead v. N.Y. ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936). 
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In the space of just two years, the Court had ripped apart the 
central features of the First New Deal and was promising the 
same for the Second. Roosevelt stopped discussing the Court’s 
decisions publicly and did not make any proposals about the 
Court during his re-election campaign. He attacked business and 
the rich as “economic royalists” and the “privileged princes of 
these new economic dynasties.”62 Roosevelt proposed a new 
economic order that would provide stability and security through 
new forms of government-provided rights. FDR reconceived 
rights from the negative—preventing the state from intruding on 
an individual liberty—to the positive—a minimum wage, the 
right to organize, national working standards, and old-age 
pensions. Running against the lackluster Republican Alf Landon, 
FDR secured one of the great electoral victories in American 
history: 523 electoral votes to Landon’s eight (the largest 
advantage ever recorded in a contested two-party election in 
American history), every state but Maine and Vermont, more 
than sixty percent of the popular vote, and a Democratic 
Congress with two-thirds majorities in both Houses, including 
seventy-five of the ninety-six seats in the Senate.63 Observers 
could legitimately question whether the Republican Party would 
shortly disappear as a political force. 
Fresh off his victory, FDR proposed a restructuring of the 
Court that would eliminate it as an opponent of the New Deal. 
On February 5, 1937, he sent Congress a judiciary “reform” bill 
that would add a new Justice to the Court for every one over the 
age of seventy. Because of the advanced age of several Justices, 
Roosevelt’s proposal would have allowed him to appoint six new 
Court members. Rather than criticize the Court for its opposition 
to the New Deal, Roosevelt disingenuously claimed that the 
elderly Justices were delaying the efficient administration of 
justice.64 In his message to Congress, FDR pointed out that the 
Court had denied review in 695 out of 803 cases.65 How can it be 
“that full justice is achieved when a court is forced by the sheer 
necessity of keeping up with its business to decline, without even 
an explanation, to hear 87 percent of the cases presented to it by 
private litigants?”66 
 
 62 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance Speech for the Renomination for the 
Presidency, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 27, 1936), http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15314 [http://perma.cc/L5AP-L8NL]. 
 63 Election of 1936, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=1936 [http://perma.cc/XQ93-MFHY]. 
 64 81 Cong. Rec. 878 (1937) (reprinting FDR’s message to Congress). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
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Only indirectly did FDR imply a link between the advanced 
age of the Justices and their opposition to the New Deal. “Modern 
complexities call also for a constant infusion of new blood in the 
courts,” FDR wrote.67 “A lowered mental or physical vigor leads 
men to avoid an examination of complicated and changed 
conditions. Little by little, new facts become blurred through old 
glasses fitted, as it were, for the needs of another generation.”68 
FDR declared that the remedy would bring a “constant and 
systematic addition of younger blood” that would “vitalize the 
courts and better equip them to recognize and apply the essential 
concepts of justice in the light of the needs and the facts of an 
ever-changing world.”69 The President’s purpose could not have 
been clearer. He submitted the plan on the Friday before the 
Court would hear Monday arguments challenging the 
constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act, one of the 
pillars of the Second New Deal. 
Despite his electoral success, FDR’s court-packing plan—the 
first domestic initiative of his second term—suffered a humiliating 
defeat. Mail and telegrams to Congress went nine-to-one against 
the plan, and polling showed a majority of the country opposed.70 
Elements of the New Deal coalition, such as farmers and some 
unions, attacked the plan early. Senate Republicans unified in 
opposition shortly after the President announced his proposal, 
and conservative Senate Democrats came out against the plan 
within days. Several liberal supporters of the New Deal followed. 
Hatton Sumners, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, 
organized a majority of his committee against the bill, saying 
“[b]oys . . . here’s where I cash in my chips.”71 Various college and 
university presidents, academics, and the American Bar 
Association opposed the plan. The coup de grace was delivered by 
none other than Chief Justice Hughes, in a letter made public 
during Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, who rebutted point 
by point FDR’s claims that the Court was overworked and that 
the older Justices could not perform their duties. Both Brandeis 
and Van Devanter approved the letter, which most historians 
believe ended the court-packing plan for good. Upon its release, 
Vice President Garner called FDR in Georgia to tell him, 
“We’re licked.”72  
 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 212 (1994). 
 71 Id. at 214. 
 72 Id. at 220. 
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Historians and political scientists have argued ever since 
over how, or even whether, FDR still won the war. On March 29, 
1937, a week after the release of the Hughes letter, the 
Court handed down a 5–4 decision upholding a Washington 
state minimum wage law for women.73 In West Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish, the lineup of votes for and against New York’s 
minimum wage, which had been struck down in Tipaldo the year 
before, remained the same—except for Justice Roberts, who 
switched sides to uphold the law.74 Overruling the earlier bans on 
minimum wage laws, Parrish made clear that the Due Process 
Clause would no longer stand in the way of government 
regulation of wages or hours. 
Two weeks later, the Court upheld the National Labor 
Relations Act, which had been challenged on the same grounds 
raised in the Sick Chicken and Carter cases.75 In NLRB v. Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Corp., Chief Justice Hughes led a 5–4 majority 
in rejecting the doctrine that manufacturing did not constitute 
interstate commerce. Jones & Laughlin Steel was the fourth-
largest steel company in the nation, with operations in multiple 
states. As the Court observed, “the stoppage of those operations 
by industrial strife would have a most serious effect upon 
interstate commerce.”76 “It is obvious,” the Court found, that the 
effect “would be immediate and might be catastrophic.”77 
Henceforth, the Court would allow federal regulation of the 
economy, even of wholly intrastate activity, because of the 
interconnectedness of the national market. To do otherwise 
would be to “shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national 
life” and to judge questions of interstate commerce “in an 
intellectual vacuum.”78 Justice Roberts again switched positions 
to make the 5–4 majority possible. 
The Court’s about-face sapped the strength from FDR’s 
court-packing campaign. By May 1937, it appeared that an 
outright majority of the Senate opposed the proposal, and opinion 
polls showed that only one third of the public supported it.79 At 
the end of the month, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported 
 
 73 See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). 
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 75 See generally NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); 
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the bill out with an unfavorable recommendation.80 Two more 
events finished things. Justice Van Devanter announced his 
retirement, timed for the same day as the Judiciary Committee 
vote, giving Roosevelt his first Supreme Court appointment. His 
departure would give the New Deal a secure majority on the 
Court. The Court also upheld the Social Security Act from attack 
as an unconstitutional spending measure or an invasion of state 
sovereignty.81 The court-packing bill lost all momentum, never 
emerged from the House Judiciary Committee, and never 
reached a floor vote. 
While FDR lost in Congress, he had won his larger objective. 
The Court would not strike down another regulation of interstate 
commerce for almost sixty years. Journalists and political 
scientists immediately attributed the “switch in time that saved 
nine” to FDR’s threat to pack the Court.82 Even today, a few 
creative scholars like Bruce Ackerman defend the sweeping 
constitutional changes of the New Deal—which, unlike 
Reconstruction, were never written into a constitutional 
amendment—with the 1936 electoral landslide and the attack on 
the Court.83 More recent work claims that the Court’s 
jurisprudence was evolving in a more generous direction toward 
federal power anyway.84 The Court, this work points out, had 
confidentially voted to uphold the minimum wage in West Coast 
Hotel on December 19, 1936, six weeks before FDR sprung his 
proposal on the nation.85 The court-packing legislation could not 
have pressured the Court because it obviously had little chance of 
passage. The argument that the 1936 elections prodded the 
Justices to switch positions on the New Deal also suffers from the 
absence of the Court as an issue during the campaign.86 If 
anything, FDR suffered politically from his confrontation with 
the Court. A growing bipartisan coalition against the New Deal 
and another sharp recession in 1938 stalled FDR’s domestic 
agenda for the rest of his presidency. 
Nonetheless, if FDR is considered a great president because 
of the New Deal, critical to his success was his willingness to 
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advance his own understanding of the Constitution. FDR never 
accepted the Court’s right to define the powers of the federal 
government to regulate the economy. While FDR did not join 
Lincoln’s blatant defiance in declining to obey a judicial order, his 
administration regularly proposed laws that ran counter to 
Supreme Court precedent, and FDR openly questioned the 
competence of the judiciary to review the New Deal.87 He sought 
to change the Court’s composition and size as a means to 
pressure it to change its rulings. With the retirement of the Four 
Horsemen, Roosevelt would appoint Hugo Black, Stanley Reed, 
Felix Frankfurter, and William O. Douglas to the Court, and by 
1941, eight of the nine Justices were his appointees. While they 
would fight about the application of the Bill of Rights against 
the states, among other issues, they would unanimously agree 
that Congress’s powers to regulate the economy were almost 
without limit.88 
In its call for a peacetime state of emergency, the New Deal 
went beyond changes to the balance of powers between the 
federal and state governments. Times of war inevitably shift 
Constitutional power and responsibility to the president as 
commander and chief. FDR and the New Deal Congress created 
an administrative state that had the same effect in times of 
peace, but which would be permanent, rather than temporary. 
Laws enacted in the first 100 days and in the years after vested 
sweeping legislative powers in the executive branch. The 
executive branch, in turn, became the fount of legislative 
proposals. FDR’s bills to cut federal spending and veterans’ 
benefits to balance the budget passed with alacrity. 
The effort to engage in rational administration made the 
executive branch the locus of regulation—issued through agency 
rulemaking, rather than acts of Congress—as the federal 
government took on the job of regulating the securities markets, 
banks, labor unions, industrial working conditions, and 
production standards. Victory, in the context of the Depression, 
was all the more difficult because, whereas war requires the 
rationing of scarce resources in favor of military production, 
ending the Depression required stimulating demand and 
production of all manner of goods, essentially altering millions of 
market decisions made every day. 
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The New Deal’s resemblance to mobilization relied upon a 
government bureaucracy more typical of wartime. America’s 
administrative state had grown in ebbs and flows, with the early 
Hamiltonian vision of a state centered around the Treasury 
Department and the Bank, Jefferson’s embargo machinery, and 
the massive departments of the Civil War representing the 
high-water marks. With the creation of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in 1887, the American administrative state started 
to grow in earnest. Progressive-era efforts to create national 
administration to manage discrete economic and social issues 
culminated in the World War I mobilization effort, which 
included everything from production quotas to press censorship.89 
Between 1887 and 1932, Congress created a few new agencies to 
oversee aspects of the economy, such as railroad rates, business 
competition, and the money supply.90 These early examples set 
the precedent of delegating lawmaking authority to the executive 
branch to set the actual rules governing private conduct. 
FDR supplemented the New Deal’s delegation of legislative 
authority to the executive branch by further enshrining the 
presidency as the focal point of political life. Even before his 
election, FDR had made clear that the candidate, not the party, 
would be the center of the campaign by renting a small plane to 
fly to Chicago to accept his nomination in person—the first 
nominee of either major party to do so.91 Once in office, he used 
new technology to reach over the heads of Congress and the 
media. Radio allowed the President to forge a direct relationship 
with the American electorate that went unfiltered by the 
newspapers. His famous “fireside chats,” the first delivered on 
the day before the government reopened the banks on March 13, 
1933, allowed FDR to campaign for his policies directly with 
the people. Roosevelt did not neglect the press either; he held 
twice-a-week, off-the-record press conferences in the Oval Office, 
where reporters could ask him any question they liked.92 He 
 
 89 See, e.g., DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN 
SOCIETY (1980); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE 
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877–1920 (1982); ROBERT H. 
WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877–1920 (1966). 
 90  Following the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, Congress 
authorized the creation of the Department of Labor and Commerce, the Food and Drug 
Administration, The Bureau of Investigation (later the Federal Bureau of Investigation), 
the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Trade Commission. 
 91 Thomas Hardy, FDR’s Nomination, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, http://www.chicago 
tribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/chi-chicagodays-fdrnomination-story-story.html 
[http://perma.cc/5ZAE-JFC2] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017). 
 92 Jean Edward Smith, Obama, F.D.R. and Taming the Press, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 2, 2009, 6:15 PM), https://100days.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/02/obama-fdr-and-
taming-the-press/.  
Do Not Delete 3/5/18 1:46 PM 
224 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:1 
employed his ample charm to win over the reporters, who burst 
out in applause after the first press conference on March 8, 1933.93 
FDR used these tools to marshal support for his legislative 
program and to change the political culture. Under Roosevelt, the 
president became the driving force for positive government, 
rather than the leader of a political system where power was 
dispersed among the branches of government, the states, and the 
political parties.94 If the presidency were to play this leading role, 
it had to strengthen its control over the executive branch itself. 
In order to fulfill the promise of economic stability, the President 
wanted full command over the varied programs and policies of 
the government. This challenge was compounded by the New 
Deal’s blizzard of new commissions and agencies, such as the 
National Recovery Administration, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the Federal Communications Commission, as 
well as the lack of a rational government structure that matched 
form to function. When Congress enacted New Deal legislation, it 
rarely reduced the size or shape of federal agencies, often simply 
creating an additional agency or layer of bureaucracy on top of 
the existing ones.  
Roosevelt sought to master the executive branch in various 
ways, with limited success. He expanded the use of aides 
attached to the White House to develop and implement policy 
instead of governing through the cabinet. FDR brought in a 
“Brain Trust,” many of them academics who had advised him 
during the 1932 campaign to develop legislation, draft speeches, 
and manage policy. Some were located in the White House, and 
others were spread in appointed positions in the agencies, but 
they all worked for the President. 
Cabinet meetings became primarily ceremonial occasions. 
Rather, policy development evolved into the form familiar today, 
with meetings between the president and chosen advisors—be 
they White House staff, cabinet officers, agency staff, or special 
committees including some combination of the former—assuming 
a central role.95 The cabinet as a whole no longer represented 
leaders of important factions within the president’s party, nor did 
there seem to be a guiding principle behind individual 
appointments. As James MacGregor Burns has observed, “[t]he 
real significance of the cabinet lay in Roosevelt’s leadership role. 
He could count on loyalty from his associates; almost everyone 
was ‘FRBC’—for Roosevelt before Chicago” (where the Democratic 
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Party nominated FDR in 1932).96 The declining importance of the 
cabinet, both in its corporeal form and in its individual members, 
naturally enhanced the control of the White House over 
the government. 
FDR used his removal power to direct policy, following the 
examples set by Lincoln, Jackson, and Washington. He fired the 
head of the Federal Power Commission, whom Hoover had 
appointed, and replaced him with his own man, even though 
legislation appeared to give the Commission itself the authority 
to choose the chairman.97 As the United States came closer to 
entry into World War II, he summarily dismissed his Secretaries 
of War and Navy and replaced them with internationalist 
Republicans without serious opposition from Congress or his 
own party.  
FDR also used his removal power to seek control over the 
independent agencies. Unlike the core departments, such as 
State, War, Treasury, and Justice, independent agencies were 
designed by Congress to be less amenable to presidential 
direction.98 Their organizing statutes usually create a 
multi-member commission at the top with a required balance 
between the political parties. In some cases, Congress shields the 
commission members from presidential removal except for cause 
(for malfeasance in office or for violating the law). Congress uses 
these devices to delegate the power to make legislative rules, 
while keeping the ability to influence its exercise and preventing 
its direct transfer to presidential control. Until FDR, presidents 
were generally understood to have the constitutional ability to 
freely remove commissioners even in the presence of these “for 
cause” protections against removal, though it is unclear to what 
extent previous presidents, in fact, used this authority.99 
Upon taking office, FDR decided to replace the head of the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), William Humphrey, a 
Hoover administration appointee. The FTC had a potential role 
in overseeing important New Deal programs due to its 
responsibility to investigate “unfair methods of competition in 
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commerce,”100 a broad jurisdictional grant of authority that 
allowed it to sue companies for monopolistic activity. The statute 
establishing the FTC allowed removal of a commissioner only in 
cases of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”101 
FDR decided to remove Humphrey only because he wanted to 
have his own man in the job. FDR wrote Humphrey: “You will, I 
know, realize that I do not feel that your mind and my mind go 
along together on either the policies or the administering of the 
Federal Trade Commission[.]”102 When Humphrey refused to 
leave, FDR fired him. Congress did not complain, and instead 
promptly confirmed FDR’s nomination of a new FTC chairman. 
Humphrey, however, remained undaunted and sued to recover 
his pay for the rest of his term. 
Four years later, Humphrey’s estate eventually took his case 
to the Supreme Court, which dealt Roosevelt and the presidency 
a serious blow.103 The Justice Department argued that the FTC 
statute was an unconstitutional infringement on the president’s 
removal power and his constitutional duty to faithfully execute 
the laws.104 Roosevelt’s lawyers relied on Myers v. United States, 
a nine-year-old case that had struck down a law requiring Senate 
consent before a president could fire a postmaster.105 In Myers, 
Chief Justice (and former president) William Howard Taft wrote: 
“The vesting of the executive power in the President was 
essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws. But the 
President alone and unaided could not execute the laws. He must 
execute them by the assistance of subordinates.”106 Taft concluded 
that the president’s duty to implement the laws required that “he 
should select those who were to act for him under his direction” 
and that he must also have the “power of removing those for 
whom he cannot continue to be responsible.”107 Based on this 
precedent, FDR seemed on safe ground. 
On the same day that it decided Schechter Poultry, May 27, 
1935, the Court substantially revised its removal jurisprudence. 
With Justice Sutherland writing, the majority held that the FTC 
“cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or 
an eye of the executive.”108 Creating a wholly new category of 
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government, Sutherland described the FTC’s functions as “quasi 
legislative or quasi judicial” because it investigated and reported 
to Congress and conducted initial adjudications on claims of anti-
competitive violations before a case went to federal court.109 The 
FTC acted “as an agency of the legislative or judicial 
departments,” and was “wholly disconnected from the executive 
department[.]”110 Myers, and the president’s discretionary 
removal authority, only applied to “purely executive” officers 
such as the Secretary of State or a postmaster.111 
The decision has long been puzzling, especially its 
recognition of a fourth branch of government that falls outside 
the three mentioned in the Constitution. Further, the reasoning 
in Humphrey’s Executor has shriveled on the vine. Recent cases 
continue to recognize Congress’s authority to shield certain 
government agents (such as the independent counsel) from 
removal even when they fall within the executive branch, not 
because they perform quasi legislative or judicial functions, but 
because their independence is critical to their functions.112 
Another oddity is that FDR’s loss in Humphrey’s Executor came 
at the hands of Justice Sutherland and the conservatives on the 
Court, who were (as we shall see), otherwise strong supporters of 
executive power, albeit in foreign affairs. 
As they demonstrated in other decisions, the Justices were 
concerned with the New Deal’s great expansion of federal power. 
They may have believed that one way to blunt the progressive 
centralization of power in the national government was to force 
the executive to disperse that power once at the federal level.113 
Not surprisingly, Congress found the Court’s approach quite 
congenial. It could delegate authority to the executive branch 
while preventing the president from exercising direct control 
over the agency. With the executive branch thus defanged, 
independent agencies naturally became more responsive to 
congressional wishes, which controlled their funding and held 
oversight hearings into their activities. And since the agencies 
were still formally within the executive branch, Congress could 
have its cake and eat it too, disclaiming any official responsibility 
for unpopular regulatory decisions. After Humphrey’s Executor, 
Congress added “for cause” limitations on removal for members 
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 113 See HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A 
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of the National Labor Relations Board, the Civil Aeronautics 
Board, and the Federal Reserve Board.114 
Creation of the permanent administrative state strained the 
presidency. With the Supreme Court and Congress limiting the 
main constitutional tool of executive control, independent 
agencies might be able to pursue policies at odds with the 
president’s understanding of federal law. Or they might press 
policy mandates in a way that caused conflict with other 
agencies, created redundancies, or ran counter to other federal 
policies. A number of methods for taming the behemoth were 
possible. Presidents could impose order by forcing the menagerie 
of departments, commissions, and agencies to act according to a 
common plan, and thereby coordinate the activities of the 
government rationally; the administrative state could be freed of 
direct control by either the president or Congress, and instead be 
subject to a variety of checks and balances by all three branches; 
or the agencies could work closely with private business and 
interest groups, which would raise objections to agency action 
with the courts, Congress, and the White House.  
FDR rejected the idea that the administrative state should 
float outside the Constitution’s traditional structure, and he 
continued to fire the heads of agencies even when Congress had 
arguably limited his power of removal. FDR, for example, 
removed the chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority in 
1938, even though Congress had established that he could only 
be fired for applying political tests or any other standards but 
“merit and efficiency” in running the agency.115 The chairman 
had attacked his Tennessee Valley Authority colleagues and had 
declared that he took orders from Congress, not the president. 
FDR removed him on the ground that the Executive Power and 
Take Care Clauses of the Constitution required that he control 
his subordinates.116 FDR established various super-cabinet 
entities with names like the Executive Council, the National 
Emergency Council, and the Industrial Emergency Committee, 
composed of cabinet officers, commission heads, and White House 
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 115 Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President Transmits to the Congress the Record of the 
Removal of the Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority (Mar. 23, 1938), in 7 THE 
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 151–53, 162–63 (Samuel I. 
Rosenman ed., 1942). 
 116 The federal courts upheld FDR’s decision, ultimately holding that Congress had 
failed to clearly prevent the President from firing on other grounds in addition to criteria 
it listed. See Morgan v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 28 F. Supp. 732, 737 (E.D. Tenn. 1939), aff’d, 
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staff.117 None of these improvisations provided a structural 
solution to the challenge posed by the administrative state, as 
these various bodies proved a poor forum for rational planning 
and control over the varied arms of the federal government. 
FDR’s last thrust to control the administrative state 
required the cooperation of Congress. In 1936, the President 
asked a commission, headed by administration expert Louis 
Brownlow, to recommend institutional changes for the improved 
governance of the administrative state.118 A year later, it 
reported: “the President needs help.”119 Its bottom line was clear. 
“[M]anagerial direction and control of all departments and 
agencies of the Executive Branch,” Brownlow wrote, “should be 
centered in the President[.]”120 
According to Brownlow, the President’s political responsibilities 
dwarfed his formal authorities. “[W]hile he now has popular 
responsibility for this direction,” the committee reported, “he is 
not equipped with adequate legal authority or administrative 
machinery to enable him to exercise it[.]”121 Brownlow and FDR, 
who approved the report, held the usual concern that the 
administrative state was wasteful, redundant, and contradictory, 
but more importantly, they worried that it would become 
so independent as to lose touch with the people.122 The 
administrative state suffered from a democracy deficit. 
The Brownlow Committee concluded that Congress must 
give the president more management resources, while keeping 
the chief executive at the center of decision-making. It advised 
that to make “our Government an up-to-date, efficient, and 
effective instrument for carrying out the will of the Nation,” 
presidential control must be enhanced.123 It recommended the 
creation of a new entity, the Executive Office of the President 
(which would house the Bureau of the Budget), six new White 
House assistants to the president, centralization of the 
government’s budgets and planning, and the merger of 
independent agencies into the cabinet departments.124 Brownlow’s 
report did not call for a professional secretariat that would 
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supervise the activities of the government, as existed in Great 
Britain. Rather, the new assistants to the president and the 
Bureau of the Budget would provide information to the president 
and carry out his orders, with Roosevelt still making all critical 
policy decisions.125 By centralizing the administrative state under 
the presidency, it would become directly accountable to Congress 
and the American people. “Strong executive leadership is 
essential to democratic government today,” the report 
concluded.126 “Our choice is not between power and no power, but 
between responsible but capable popular government and 
irresponsible autocracy.”127 
FDR had the report’s recommendations distilled into a bill he 
presented to the congressional leadership in January 1937. In a 
four-hour presentation, FDR personally laid out the plan and 
declared: “The President’s task has become impossible for me or 
any other man. A man in this position will not be able to survive 
White House service unless it is simplified. I need executive 
assistants with a ‘passion for anonymity’ to be my legs.”128 Even 
though the 75th Congress began with a two-thirds Democratic 
majority, it was wary of FDR’s plans and less than thrilled at the 
prospect of greater presidential influence over the New Deal 
state. Roosevelt’s plan undermined the benefits to Congress of 
delegation because it would weaken Congress’s influence over 
agency decisions while expanding the president’s authority over 
what was essentially lawmaking. 
Brownlow’s report landed before Congress at the same time 
as FDR’s court-packing plan. While the two plans addressed 
different problems, they fed the same fear of presidential 
aggrandizement at the expense of the other branches. Key 
congressional leaders had not been consulted or briefed on the 
reorganization plan, which they proceeded to attack as another 
step toward despotism, or a power grab by the university 
intellectuals who no doubt would run the new agencies. At a time 
when totalitarianism was raising its ugly head in Europe, fears 
of consolidated executive power were particularly salient. In 
1938, the bill failed in the House and was replaced by a more 
modest bill that gave FDR a limited ability to reorganize 
government.129 Under that authority, FDR still managed to 
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locate the Bureau of the Budget within a new Executive Office of 
the President. As the Office of Management and Budget, it today 
exercises central review over the economic costs and benefits of 
all federal regulation, one of the president’s most powerful tools 
for rationalizing the activities of the administrative state.130  
FDR also expanded the resources within the White House, 
an institution now separate from the Executive Office of the 
President, which enabled him to gain more information and 
control over the cabinet agencies. Still, the independent agencies 
remained outside the cabinet departments. FDR never 
successfully established any single entity to coordinate the 
activities of the entire administrative state, and his failed bill 
demonstrates the enduring constitutional checks on the 
presidency. Despite FDR’s growing power, only Congress could 
pass the laws needed to reorganize the cabinet departments, 
re-shape the jurisdiction and structure of the independent 
agencies, and provide the funds and positions in a new, 
revitalized White House.131 
While FDR suffered defeats at the hands of Congress, he 
continued to claim and exercise inherent executive authority that 
went beyond mere control of personnel. He signed statements to 
object to riders inserted into needed spending bills, which he 
believed to be unconstitutional. Congress, for example, attempted 
to force the President to fire three bureaucrats it believed were 
“subversives” by specifically barring any federal funds to pay 
their salaries.132 Roosevelt signed the bill but objected to its 
unconstitutional end run around the president’s power over the 
removal of executive branch officials. Ultimately, the officials left 
within months, but they sued for their back pay all the way 
to the Supreme Court, which agreed that Congress had violated 
the Constitution.133 
President Roosevelt also followed Lincoln’s example in using 
his executive power to fight racial discrimination. Although 
Lincoln had relied on his power as Commander-in-Chief to free 
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the slaves, the southern states imposed racial segregation in the 
years after the Civil War, ultimately with the approval of the 
Supreme Court.134 While FDR did not take segregation head on, 
he issued an executive order in 1941 to prohibit racial 
discrimination in employment on federal defense contracts.135 
Roosevelt had no statutory authority to order the federal 
government to provide fair treatment in employment to all, 
regardless of race. He could rely only upon his constitutional 
authority as president to oversee the management of federal 
programs. Once war began, President Roosevelt could clarify that 
his orders were taken under his power as both Chief Executive 
and Commander-in-Chief in wartime.136 FDR’s orders would 
not be the first time, nor the last time, that the cause of 
racial equality would depend on a broad understanding of 
presidential power. 
The New Deal depended upon broad theories of the 
presidency and the role of the federal government in national 
life. What remains less clear is whether FDR’s fundamental 
re-orientation of the government into a positive, active 
instrument of national policy was worthwhile. Contemporary 
critics of the modern presidency question whether chief 
executives, acting alone, have led the nation into disastrous 
wars.137 We need also ask, but rarely do, whether the expansion 
of executive power domestically has benefited the nation. To the 
extent we debate the desirability of the administrative state, 
most American scholars today bemoan the fact that the New 
Deal did not go far enough. They argue that the New Deal failed 
because it did not achieve a full-fledged European welfare state, 
or that FDR’s coalition fragmented and failed to follow through 
on the promise of liberal reform.138 These critics, often the most 
vocal detractors of the muscular executive action in foreign 
affairs, cry out for more executive power domestically. 
Vesting the president with more authority to control the 
government’s regulation of the economy may make sense during 
an emergency, but it did not work in solving the Great 
Depression. Economists recognize today that the New Deal 
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neither put an end to high rates of unemployment nor restored 
consistent economic growth.139 FDR’s monetary and fiscal policy 
were often counterproductive. Full employment would return 
only with American rearmament in the first years of World War 
II. Other New Deal policies were similarly confused, such as 
allowing industry to set production quotas, reduce production to 
raise prices, and restrict employment by raising minimum wages. 
Economists similarly doubt whether the creation of national 
regulation of the securities markets and other industries 
contributed to the eventual economic recovery, even though it 
was certainly valuable for postwar prosperity. If, as Milton 
Friedman argues, the Great Depression would have proven to be 
only a normal recession with some deft monetary policy from the 
Federal Reserve,140 it bears asking whether the expansive, 
permanent bureaucracy was needed at all. 
Decades later, American presidents would campaign against 
the burdensome regulations made possible by the New Deal. The 
administrative state we have today failed to end the Great 
Depression. There is little doubt that the explosion in the size 
and power of the administrative state has transformed the 
nature of American politics. Considering this, was the 
administrative state worth the price?  
The federal government has dramatically expanded the 
scope of regulation to include not only national economic activity, 
such as workplace conditions and minimum wages and hours, 
but also the environment and endangered species, educational 
standards, state and local corruption, consumer product safety, 
communications technology and ownership, illegal narcotics and 
gun crimes, and corporate governance. It has produced less 
deliberation in Congress, which now delegates sweeping powers 
to the agencies, and has placed the initial authority to issue 
federal law affecting private individuals in administrative 
agencies. Those agencies are not directly accountable to the 
people through elections, except for the thin layer of presidential 
appointees at the very top. Special-interest groups have come to 
play a significant role in influencing both congressional 
committees and agencies, gaining economic “rents” for their 
members at the expense of the broader public. 
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This is not a plea to return to the laissez-faire capitalism of 
the nineteenth century variety. The modern administrative state 
no doubt has produced social benefits, and there are important 
areas where the greater information and expertise held by the 
executive agencies improves government policy, but it remains 
an open question whether the centralization of economic and 
social regulation in the national government has been, on 
balance, a success. It is undeniable that the requirement of 
minimum national standards, most especially in the area of civil 
rights, was a necessary and long-overdue change. Equality under 
law should not have been a matter of legislative or executive 
discretion, but a requirement of the Reconstruction Amendments 
to the Constitution. National control of other economic and social 
issues, however, may not have been worth the cost in increased 
government spending, larger budget deficits, a permanent 
government apparatus of unprecedented size (at least in the 
American experience), the rise of interest-group politics, and 
interference with efficient market mechanisms. 
Federal agencies may impose uniform rules, but they may 
not impose the best rules. In the absence of broad national 
regulation, states could enact a diversity of policies on issues 
such as the economy, environment, education, crime, and social 
policy. People could vote with their feet by moving to states that 
adopt their preferred package of policies, while experimentation 
could identify the most effective solutions to economic and social 
problems. The New Deal’s concentration of regulatory authority 
in Washington, D.C. sapped the vitality of the states, whose 
powers are only a pale imitation of those they held in the 
nineteenth century.141 FDR certainly deserves credit for restoring 
Americans’ optimism and faith in government, and for alleviating 
the suffering inflicted by the Depression, but it remains doubtful 
whether the great wrenching in the fabric of our federal system 
of government and the expansion in the president’s constitutional 
powers in the domestic realm can be justified by any limited 
advance in triggering a recovery. Despite its revolution in 
domestic presidential power and government structure, the New 
Deal appears to have had little impact on ending the worst 
economic collapse in American history. 
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II. THE GATHERING STORM 
FDR’s claim to greatness lies not in the New Deal, but in his 
defeat of one of the greatest external threats our nation has 
faced: fascist Germany and imperial Japan. FDR exercised 
farsighted vision in preparing the nation for a necessary war 
unwanted by a large minority, and at times a majority, of 
Congress and the American people. In the process, the President 
skirted, stretched, and broke a series of neutrality laws designed 
to prevent American entry into World War II. Sometimes he went 
to Congress and the American people to seek support for his 
actions. Other times he did not. But, regardless of the where, or 
if, FDR sought support for his actions in the lead up to war, FDR 
firmly established that the power to make national security 
policy resided in the Oval Office.142 
Debate has raged for decades over whether the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise, or whether FDR or the 
American government had advance knowledge of the attack. 
Some have suspected that FDR believed the only way to rouse a 
reluctant American public to war was for the United States to be 
attacked first. In this respect, FDR had the same instincts as 
Lincoln. The conventional wisdom today attributes more of the 
blame for Pearl Harbor to incompetence by the field commanders 
and complacency in Washington, and has put to rest the idea 
that FDR actually knew that the Japanese would attack 
Pearl Harbor.143  
Recent scholarly work suggests that FDR managed events to 
maneuver the Japanese into a corner, with a strong possibility 
that the Japanese would attack American interests somewhere in 
the Pacific, most likely the Philippines. Roosevelt’s imposition of 
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an arms, steel, and oil embargo against the Japanese Empire was 
designed to force Tokyo to either withdraw from China or attack 
American, British, and Dutch possessions in Asia for natural 
resources.144 FDR pressed Japan in order to bring the United 
States to bear against the greater threat of Germany.145 FDR 
could not have walked the United States to the brink of war 
without an expansive interpretation of the president’s 
constitutional powers and the willingness to exercise them. 
Roosevelt had laid claim to sweeping executive authority in 
foreign affairs even before war with Germany and Japan looked 
certain. He was assisted, at times, from an unlikely source: 
Justice Sutherland. While Sutherland believed the New Deal 
state unconstitutionally trampled on the natural rights of 
individuals, as Hadley Arkes has argued, he still strongly 
supported presidential power in foreign affairs.146 This became 
clear in the case United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.147 
In 1934, Congress had delegated to the president the 
authority to cut off all U.S. arms sales to Bolivia and Paraguay, 
which were fighting a nasty border war, if he found the ban 
would advance peace in the region.148 FDR proclaimed an arms 
embargo in effect on the same day Congress passed the law,149 
and the next day the Justice Department prosecuted four 
executives of the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation for trying 
to sell fifteen machine guns to Bolivia.150 Curtiss-Wright, which 
traced its roots to the Wright brothers, would supply the engines 
for the DC-3 air transport and the B-17 Flying Fortress and 
build the P-40 fighter.151 Taking its case all the way to the 
Supreme Court, the company argued that the law had delegated 
unconstitutional authority over international commerce to the 
president.152 If Congress wanted to impose an arms embargo, it 
would have to do it itself, not just hand the authority to FDR. 
In a remarkable and controversial opinion, Justice 
Sutherland declared that the constitutional standards that ruled 
the government’s actions domestically did not apply in the same 
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way to foreign affairs.153 The Constitution’s careful limitation of 
the national government’s powers, so as to preserve the general 
authority of the states, did not extend beyond the water’s edge. 
In the arena of foreign affairs, Sutherland maintained, the 
American Revolution had directly transferred the full powers of 
national sovereignty from Great Britain to the Union. “The 
powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make 
treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other 
sovereignties,” Sutherland wrote, “if they had never been 
mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal 
government as necessary concomitants of nationality.”154 In 
words that could have been cribbed from Abraham Lincoln, the 
Court declared that the “Union existed before the Constitution,” 
and therefore the Union could exercise the same powers over war 
and peace as any other nation.155 
An argument in favor of exclusive federal power over 
national security and international relations, however, does not 
dictate which branch should exercise it. Sutherland located that 
authority in the president for inherently practical considerations. 
The dangers posed by foreign nations required the structural 
ability to act swiftly and secretly, unique to the executive branch. 
“In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, 
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the 
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”156 
Echoing Hamilton and Jefferson, and quoting then Congressman 
John Marshall, Sutherland declared, “The President is the sole 
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole 
representative with foreign nations.”157  
Justice Sutherland notably eschewed the opportunity for a 
narrow holding in conferring wide latitude to the executive 
branch. It did not matter that, on the facts of Curtiss-Wright, 
FDR was acting pursuant to congressional delegation. “We are 
here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President 
by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority 
plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the 
President,” which does not “require as a basis for its exercise an 
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act of Congress.”158 Sutherland found great advantages to the 
United States in vesting these powers in the executive, rather 
than the legislature. The president, not Congress, “has the better 
opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign 
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has 
confidential sources of information.”159 
Another case gave Justice Sutherland the opportunity to 
deliver a second blessing to FDR’s vigorous use of his presidential 
powers. In 1933, Roosevelt ended American efforts to isolate the 
Soviet Union and unilaterally recognized its communist 
government. As part of an executive agreement with the Soviets, 
the United States took on all rights and claims of the USSR 
against American citizens, such as those involving the 
expropriation of property.160 The federal government sued to 
recover money and property held by Russians in the United 
States, which were allegedly owed to the Soviet government.161 
What made the recognition of the Soviet Union so remarkable 
was that FDR not only had set the policy of the United States 
and entered into an international agreement on his own, but the 
government used that unilateral agreement to set aside state 
property and contract rules previously considered sacrosanct—all 
without any action of Congress or the Senate. 
Property owners resisted. Augustus Belmont, a New York 
City banker, refused to turn over deposits held on behalf of the 
Petrograd Metal Works after the nationalization of all Russian 
corporations in 1918.162 FDR’s executive agreement with the 
Soviets required that legal ownership of the profits transferred to 
the United States government. Belmont’s estate refused to turn 
the money over because, it claimed, the property law of New York 
state protected it.163  
In United States v. Belmont, the Supreme Court again sided 
with the executive. It found that the recognition of the USSR, the 
international agreement, and the pre-emption of state law all fell 
within the president’s constitutional powers to the exclusion of 
the states.164 “In respect of all international negotiations and 
compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state 
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lines disappear. As to such purposes the State of New York does 
not exist.”165 Presidents since have used this power to make 
literally thousands of international agreements with other 
countries without the Senate’s advice and consent—from 1939 
to 1989, the United States entered into 11,698 executive 
agreements and only 702 treaties.166 The courts have 
upheld sole executive agreements several times since, including 
an agreement ending the Iranian hostage crisis and another 
pre-empting the state law claims of Holocaust survivors against 
German companies.167 
The Supreme Court did not grant the president these powers 
in foreign affairs; only the Constitution could do that. Presidents 
from Washington onward had interpreted the Constitution’s 
vesting of the executive and Commander-in-Chief authorities to 
give them the initiative to protect the national security, set 
foreign policy, and negotiate with other nations. Sutherland’s 
opinions gave judicial recognition to decades of presidential 
practice; what had been the product of presidential enterprise 
and congressional acquiescence became formal constitutional 
law. Roosevelt would draw on these authorities as he 
maneuvered to send aid to the Allies and bring the United States 
into the war against the fascist powers. 
Facing existential threats in the combination of a looming 
global conflict and domestic isolationism, FDR drew deeply from 
his well of presidential powers. As early as 1935, Roosevelt had 
concluded that Hitler’s Germany posed a threat to the United 
States.168 As the Axis powers increased the size, strength, and 
quality of their militaries while launching offensives against 
their neighbors, the President became convinced that military 
force would be necessary to protect American interests. 
Neutrality offered a false promise of safety. FDR’s approach 
represented something of a revolution in American strategic 
thought. No longer would American national security depend on 
the safety provided by two oceans and control of the Western 
Hemisphere, where it had felt no reluctance to launch wars of its 
own.169 A German defeat of Great Britain would remove a 
valuable buffer that had prevented European nations from naval 
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and air access to the Americas. And if Hitler succeeded in gaining 
complete control of the resources of the European continent, 
Germany would become a superpower with the means to 
threaten the United States.170 A central objective of American 
strategy was to maintain a balance of power in Europe and Asia 
to contain expansionist Germany and Japan, but if war came, 
FDR and his advisors identified Hitler as the primary threat.171 
By December 1940, FDR could be relatively open with the 
public about his broader goals. In his famous “Arsenal of 
Democracy” speech, he accused the fascist powers of conquering 
Europe as a prelude to larger aims that threatened the United 
States. Never since “Jamestown and Plymouth Rock has our 
American civilization been in such danger as now,” FDR 
warned.172 “The Nazi masters of Germany have made it clear 
that they intend not only to dominate all life and thought in their 
own country,” FDR told the nation by radio, “but also to enslave 
the whole of Europe, and then to use the resources of Europe to 
dominate the rest of the world.”173 He rejected the idea that the 
“broad expanse of the Atlantic and of the Pacific” would protect 
the United States.174 It was only the British navy that protected 
the oceans from the Nazis. The United States had to begin 
massive rearmament and provide arms and assistance to the free 
nations that were bearing the brunt of the fighting. FDR did not 
tell the public that he was already taking action to bring the 
nation closer to war, first against Europe to stop Hitler, while 
holding off Japanese expansion in Asia. 
FDR’s strategic vision required several elements to succeed. 
The United States had to send military and financial aid to 
Britain and France, help those supplies cross the Atlantic Ocean, 
and build up the United States military (especially the Navy and 
Army Air Corps). If the Allies’ fortunes fell far enough, the nation 
would have to be prepared to intervene militarily. Resistance to 
these steps was widespread. Many Americans believed that 
President Wilson had erred in entering World War I; they 
wanted to avoid American involvement in another internecine 
squabble in Europe. Between 1939 and 1941, a majority of 
Americans grew to support aid to the Allies, but that was as far 
as they would go. As late as May 1941, almost eighty percent of 
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the public wanted the United States to stay out of the conflict.175 
Seventy percent felt that FDR had gone too far or had helped 
Britain enough.176 Isolationists blamed American entry into 
World War I on President Wilson’s use of his executive powers to 
tilt American neutrality toward Britain and France.177 Worried 
about a re-run, they pressed for strict limitations on presidential 
power to keep the United States out of the European war.178 
Opposition to American intervention took more concrete 
form than public opinion polls. Congress enacted Neutrality Acts 
in 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1939 to prevent the United States from 
aiding either side. Congress passed the 1935 Act after Germany 
repudiated the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of 
Versailles and Italy threatened to invade Ethiopia in defiance of 
the League of Nations. It required the president to proclaim, 
after the outbreak of war between two or more nations, an 
embargo of all arms, ammunition or “implements of war” against 
the belligerents.179 It gave FDR the authority to decide when to 
terminate the embargo, but it left him little choice as to when to 
begin one.  
The Act prohibited the United States from helping a victim 
nation and punishing the aggressor, instead requiring a complete 
cut-off for both. FDR had privately opposed the law’s mandatory 
terms, fought to keep his discretionary control over foreign 
affairs, and in signing the bill predicted that its “inflexible 
provisions might drag us into war instead of keeping us out.”180 
Later acts prohibited the extension of loans or financial 
assistance to belligerents,181 extended the embargo to civil 
wars,182 and allowed the ban to cover only arms and munitions, 
but not raw materials. In 1939, Congress enacted an even 
tougher prohibition that sought to prevent belligerents from 
“cash-and-carry” transactions for raw materials by prohibiting 
American vessels from transporting anything to nations at war.  
Domestic resistance required FDR to adopt an approach that 
gave the appearance that the United States was being dragged 
into the war. By 1941, with Hitler in control of Europe and Japan 
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occupying large parts of China, FDR wanted to find a way for the 
United States to enter the war on the side of Britain. In August 
1941, for example, FDR told Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
that he could not rely on Congress to declare war against 
Germany.183 Instead, FDR “would wage war, but not declare 
it.”184 According to Churchill’s account of their conversation at 
the Atlantic Conference, FDR said “he would become more and 
more provocative” and promised that “everything would be 
done to force an incident” that would “justify him in 
opening hostilities.”185 
Roosevelt’s plans to move the United States toward war 
depended in part on Congress. The Constitution gives Congress 
control over international and domestic interstate commerce, as 
well as the money and property of the United States. FDR could 
lay little claim to constitutional authority to dictate arms-export 
policies or to provide financial and material aid to the Allies. 
FDR initially hoped that the United States could provide enough 
assistance to Britain and France—the United States would prove 
the “great Arsenal of Democracy,”186 in his famous words—to 
postpone the need for American military intervention in Europe. 
After the fall of France, FDR realized that Great Britain could 
not hold off the Nazis on its own, but he hoped to send enough 
aid to keep Britain alive while he prepared the American public 
for war. 
FDR pressed Congress for several changes to the Neutrality 
Acts that would send more help to the Allies. In the 1936 and 
1937 Acts, for example, the administration won more 
presidential discretion to determine when a foreign war had 
broken out.187 By 1939, it succeeded in changing the law to allow 
the president to put off a proclamation of neutrality if necessary 
to protect American peace and security.188 This effectively 
allowed Britain and France, which controlled the sea routes to 
the Americas, to continue to receive aid.  
FDR used this flexibility to continue supplying arms and 
money to China by declining to find a war to exist there, even 
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after Japan had attacked Beijing and Nanjing.189 Similarly, 
Roosevelt refused to invoke the Neutrality Acts when Germany 
invaded Czechoslovakia in 1939, or Russia in 1941, because a 
blanket embargo would have prevented American aid from 
flowing to the Allies.190 Manipulating the embargo rules to 
affirmatively support one side of various conflicts, FDR showed 
little respect for the spirit of the Neutrality Acts. But Congress 
would not allow him to go farther. FDR’s proposals throughout 
1939 and 1940 to reform the Neutrality Acts to allow for direct 
military aid to the Allies repeatedly failed. 
As his efforts to modify the Neutrality Acts flagged, FDR 
became more aggressive in invoking his inherent constitutional 
authority. He asked Attorney General Robert Jackson, “How far 
do you think I can go in ignoring the existing act—even though I 
did sign it?”191 Vice President John Nance Garner and Secretary 
of the Interior Harold Ickes argued that the President’s 
constitutional authority in foreign affairs allowed him to act 
beyond the Acts.192 Instead of overriding them, however, 
Roosevelt simply became more creative in interpreting them. On 
May 22, 1940, as German armies swept through France, FDR 
ordered the sale of World War I-era equipment to the Allies; on 
June 3rd, he ordered the transfer of $38 million in weapons to 
U.S. Steel, which promptly sold them at no profit to the British 
and French.193 The administration argued that these sales did 
not violate the Neutrality Acts because the arms were 
“surplus.”194 Three days later (just after the British had 
evacuated 300,000 soldiers from the German noose around 
Dunkirk), the Navy sold fifty Hell Diver bombers, which had 
been introduced to service only in 1938, to Britain because they 
were “temporarily in excess of requirements.”195 The sales 
occurred at a time when the United States army could field only 
80,000 combat troops in five divisions, while the German army in 
western Europe deployed two million men in 140 divisions.196 The 
U.S. Army Air Corps had only 160 fighter planes and fifty-two 
heavy bombers.197 Announcing the decision on June 8th, FDR 
told a news conference that “a plane can get out of date darned 
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fast.”198 Two days later, in a speech at the University of Virginia, 
FDR declared isolationism an “obvious delusion” and called for 
an allied victory over “the gods of force and hate” to prevent a 
world run by totalitarian governments.199 
American aid came too little, too late; France requested an 
armistice on June 17, 1940.200 In the midst of a presidential 
campaign for an unprecedented third term, FDR sought 
bipartisan support for his policies and replaced isolationists in 
his cabinet with two internationalist Republicans: Henry 
Stimson as Secretary of War and Frank Knox as Secretary of the 
Navy.201 Both favored repealing the neutrality laws, boosting the 
U.S. military through a draft, and sending large amounts of aid 
to Great Britain.202 Britain’s destroyer fleet, which had suffered 
almost fifty percent losses, needed reinforcements to block a 
German invasion force and safeguard its trade lifelines.203 
Churchill wrote to Roosevelt that acquiring American destroyers 
was “a matter of life and death.”204 FDR reacted by planning to 
send two-dozen PT-boats immediately, and said that Navy 
lawyers who thought the sale illegal should follow orders or go on 
vacation.205 After word of FDR’s plans leaked, Congress enacted a 
law forbidding the sale of any military equipment “essential to 
the defense of the United States” as certified by the Chief 
of Naval Operations or the Army Chief of Staff, and reasserted 
a World War I ban on sending any “vessel of war” to 
a belligerent.206 
Congress’s tightening of neutrality delayed FDR for two 
months. While the Battle of Britain raged in the skies, Churchill 
begged FDR for additional destroyers. “The whole fate of the 
war,” the Prime Minister wrote in July, “may be decided by this 
minor and easily remediable factor,” and he urged that “this is 
the thing to do now.”207 FDR and his advisors planned a transfer 
to Britain of fifty World War I destroyers declared to be 
“surplus,” even though similar warships from the same era were 
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being activated for Navy service.208 In exchange, Britain would 
provide basing rights in its Western Hemisphere territories to 
the United States. In August, the President concluded an 
executive agreement with Britain, kept secret at first and 
without congressional approval, to make the trade.209 
FDR’s advisors divided over the deal’s legality. One legal 
advisor believed it violated the June 28th statute and the 
Espionage Act of 1917, which forbade sending an armed vessel to 
any belligerent while the United States remained neutral; State 
Department and Justice Department lawyers agreed.210 But 
Dean Acheson, then Undersecretary of the Treasury, argued that 
the June 28th law implicitly recognized the president’s 
constitutional power to transfer any military asset in order to 
improve national security, while others recommended that the 
government first sell the destroyers to private companies that 
could then resell them to the British.211 Acheson even went 
further. He argued that the 1917 law applied only to ships that 
were built specifically on order for a belligerent and not to 
existing ships originally built or used for the Navy.212  
Attorney General Jackson drew on these ideas in his legal 
opinion blessing the deal, but also relied on the president’s 
Commander-in-Chief power. “Happily there has been little 
occasion in our history for the interpretation of the powers of the 
President as Commander-in-Chief,” Jackson wrote to FDR.213 “I 
do not find it necessary to rest upon that power alone.”214 
Nevertheless, “it will hardly be open to controversy that the 
vesting of such a function in the President also places upon him a 
responsibility to use all constitutional authority which he may 
possess to provide adequate bases and stations” for the most 
effective use of the armed forces.215 The perilous circumstances 
facing the United States reinforced the Commander-in-Chief’s 
power. “It seems equally beyond doubt that present world 
conditions forbid him to risk any delay that is constitutionally 
avoidable.”216 Any statutory effort by Congress to prevent the 
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president from transferring military equipment to help American 
national security would be of “questionable constitutionality.”217 
Jackson defended the exclusion of Congress. He thought that 
the deal could take the form of an executive agreement because it 
required neither the appropriation of funds nor an obligation to 
act in the future.218 Justice Sutherland’s opinion in Curtiss-
Wright, which the Attorney General extensively quoted, 
supported the argument.219 Jackson had a more difficult time 
with the Neutrality Acts. He read the June 28th law to recognize 
the president’s authority to transfer naval vessels to Britain, 
subject only to the requirement that they be surplus or obsolete. 
It did not prohibit the transfer of property “merely because it is 
still used or usable or of possible value for future use,” but only if 
the transfer weakened the national defense.220 The “over-age” 
destroyers, as he called them, could be found to fall outside the 
statute and hence within the president’s authority, which must 
have derived from the Commander-in-Chief power, to exchange 
them for valuable military bases.221 Jackson, however, advised 
that transferring brand-new mosquito boats would violate 
Congress’s ban on sending ships to a belligerent. 
Jackson issued an even broader reading of the Commander-
in-Chief power in May 1941, when FDR allowed British pilots to 
train in American military schools. Under the Commander-in-
Chief power, the president “has supreme command over the land 
and naval forces of the country and may order them to perform 
such military duties as, in his opinion, are necessary or 
appropriate for the defense of the United States.”222 The 
president could “command and direct the armed forces in their 
immediate movements and operations” and “dispose of troops 
and equipment” to promote the national security.223 Jackson read 
the passage of Lend-Lease as support for FDR’s judgment that 
helping Britain was important to the national defense.224 If the 
president had full constitutional authority to use the armed 
forces, even to use military force, to protect the nation by helping 
Britain, then he must also have the lesser power to train British 
airmen. “I have no doubt of the President’s lawful authority to 
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utilize forces under his command to instruct others in matters of 
defense which are vital to the security of the United States.”225 It 
“would be anomalous indeed,” Jackson observed, if the military 
could provide Britain with arms but could not train the British 
how to use them.226 
Reaction to the destroyers-for-bases deal, announced in early 
August, attacked FDR’s methods more than his goals. Roosevelt 
worried that his energetic use of executive power would feed 
fears that he was becoming an autocrat, worries punctuated by 
his nomination that summer for an unprecedented third term as 
president. Leaks of secret Anglo-American staff talks and 
announcement of a joint U.S.–Canadian defense board already 
had isolationists attacking FDR for pushing the United States 
towards war.227 FDR predicted that revelation of the executive 
agreement would “raise hell with Congress” and lead to 
accusations he was a “warmonger” and “dictator,” and might 
torpedo his re-election hopes.228  
FDR’s first two predictions quickly came true. His 
Republican opponent, Wendell Willkie, supported the policy but 
declared that FDR’s unilateral action was “the most dictatorial 
and arbitrary act of any president in the history of the United 
States.”229 Edwin Borchard, a Yale professor of international law, 
argued that Roosevelt had assumed dictatorial powers, placed 
himself above the law, and threatened to “break down 
constitutional safeguards.”230 The Constitution, Borchard wrote, 
“does not give the President carte blanche to do anything he 
pleases in foreign affairs.”231 The nation’s leading scholar of 
constitutional law, Edward Corwin of Princeton, attacked 
Jackson’s opinion as “an endorsement of unrestrained autocracy 
in the field of our foreign relations, neither more nor less.”232 In 
The New York Times, Corwin asked “why may not any and all of 
Congress’s specifically delegated powers be set aside by the 
President’s ‘executive power’ and the country be put on a 
totalitarian basis without further ado?”233 
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Despite these ringing attacks on presidential power, the 
destroyers-for-bases deal proved remarkably popular—Gallup 
polls showed sixty-two percent in favor—encouraging even bolder 
steps.234 By October 1940, FDR asked for and received 
appropriations of $17.7 billion for national defense—his 
administration’s original estimate for the year had been $1.84 
billion—and defense spending doubled the following year.235 In 
June 1940, he called for the first peacetime draft in American 
history, which Congress enacted in September only after Willkie 
publicly agreed. A Wall Street lawyer and former Democrat, 
Willkie was a dark-horse candidate who had won the nomination 
without ever having occupied public office. His attacks on the 
New Deal had gained little traction during the campaign, so 
Willkie pivoted, painting FDR as a “warmonger” and dictator 
who had made “secret agreements” to enter a war that would kill 
thousands of young Americans. “If [Roosevelt’s] promise to keep 
our boys out of foreign wars is no better than his promise to 
balance the budget,” Willkie said on the stump, “they’re already 
almost on the transports.”236 By the end of October, Willkie came 
within four points of the President, and Roosevelt went on a 
speaking tour to reassure mothers in a speech at Boston Garden 
on October 30, 1940, that “[y]our boys are not going to be 
sent into any foreign wars.”237 Though the polls showed the 
election close, FDR prevailed by twenty-seven million to Willkie’s 
twenty-two million and an Electoral College majority of 449–82. 
After the election, FDR redoubled his efforts to send aid to 
Britain. He authorized secret staff talks between American and 
British military planners, who recommended a grand strategy of 
defeating Germany first while holding Japan to a stalemate.238 In 
November, FDR ordered the army to make B-17 bombers 
immediately available to the British, to be replaced by British 
planes on order in American factories, and he discussed making 
half of all American arms production available to the British. 
British finances collapsed in late November; the country could no 
longer pay for the material it needed to continue the war. 
Britain’s ambassador to the United States, Lord Lothian, 
appealed to the American public on November 23rd by saying to 
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a group of journalists, “[w]ell, boys, Britain’s broke; it’s your 
money we want.”239 
Lothian’s report of Britain’s functional bankruptcy shocked 
the White House into action. FDR approved the sale of $2.1 
billion in weapons that the British could not pay for, as well as 
the diversion of $700 million in Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation funds to underwrite the factory expansions needed 
for the increased arms sales.240 The President hit upon one of his 
most artful evasions of neutrality, Lend-Lease, which would “get 
away from the dollar sign,” as he told reporters at a December 
17, 1940, press conference.241 The United States would “lend” 
Britain weapons and munitions and, rather than demand 
immediate payment, would expect their return after the war’s 
end. Of course, the idea was a complete fiction; war would 
consume the arms. Ever canny in his presentations to the public, 
FDR deployed a homey analogy: If a house were on fire, a 
neighbor would lend a garden hose with the expectation that it 
would be returned later, rather than demanding $15 for the cost 
of the hose.242 
Lend-Lease required congressional action. In his famous 
“Arsenal of Democracy” speech on December 29th, Roosevelt 
defended Lend-Lease and broader aid to the allies with his most 
stirring language.243 FDR declared that the Nazis posed the most 
direct threat to the security of the United States since its 
founding.244 To avoid war, the United States would have to 
become the great “arsenal of democracy” for the free nations 
carrying on the fight.245 The United States would be less likely to 
get into war “if we do all we can now to support the nations 
defending themselves against attack by the Axis,” rather than “if 
we acquiesce in their defeat.”246  
Disclaiming any intention to send a new “American 
Expeditionary Force” outside the United States, FDR declared 
that “the people of Europe who are defending themselves do not 
ask us to do their fighting.”247 All they sought were “the 
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implements of war.”248 Increasing national defense production 
and sending it to Britain would “keep war away from our country 
and our people.”249 It was one of the most popular speeches of 
FDR’s presidency: roughly eighty percent of the public agreed.250 
Congress waited until March 1941 to give its approval to 
Lend-Lease,251 but FDR decided to move forward during that 
critical time anyway. He authorized British purchase of 23,000 
airplanes in November 1940, and rifles and ammunition in 
February 1941. He ordered the U.S. military to purchase 
munitions factories but diverted the production to Britain.252 
In spring 1941, FDR turned to the protection of the supplies 
that would begin to flow across the Atlantic, and took unilateral 
action that provoked the Nazis and drew the United States ever 
closer to war. In March, FDR moved to place Greenland under 
American military protection, and in April he gave orders to the 
Navy to extend its security zone as far as Greenland and the 
Azores, and to begin locating German submarines and reporting 
their positions to the Royal Navy. In May, he transferred 
one-quarter of the Pacific fleet to the Atlantic to deter any 
German effort to seize Atlantic islands for bases. He declared an 
“unlimited national emergency” at the end of the month and told 
the nation that helping Britain win the battle of the Atlantic was 
critical to keeping the Nazis out of the Western Hemisphere.253 
“[I]t would be suicide to wait until they are in our front yard,” 
Roosevelt argued.254 He followed his speech with a June 
deployment of a Marine brigade to occupy Iceland (which is about 
1200 miles from London and 2800 miles from Washington, D.C.), 
which freed up a British division and extended the American 
security zone even further. In July, he announced that the 
Navy would begin escorting ships between the United States 
and Iceland. 
FDR did not seek or receive congressional approval for any of 
these deployments, which made clear, if earlier aid had not, that 
the United States was no longer a true neutral. Still, Congress 
retained ample checks on presidential power. FDR could send 
 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. 
 250 See DALLEK, supra note 142, at 257. 
 251 See 55 Stat. 31 (1941); see DAVIS, supra note 239, at 92–136 (providing lengthy 
congressional discussions on Lend-Lease). 
 252 See Fellmeth, supra note 189, at 485–86. 
 253 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “We Choose Human Freedom” — A Radio Address 
Announcing the Proclamation of an Unlimited National Emergency (May 27, 1941), in 10 
THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 181, 193 (Samuel I. 
Rosenman ed., 1950). 
 254 Id. at 189. 
Do Not Delete 3/5/18 1:46 PM 
2018] Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power 251 
only 4000 Marines to Iceland because of the small size of the 
regular armed forces, and he could not send any of the new 
draftees because Congress had attached a provision to the 
conscription act forbidding their deployment outside the Western 
Hemisphere.255 Congress had also limited the terms of service of 
the 900,000 draftees to one year, requiring FDR to go to Congress 
to win an extension.256 Even with America occupying Iceland and 
Greenland and escorting ships in the North Atlantic, only fifty-one 
percent of Americans supported the draft extension, and Congress 
narrowly approved it.257 
Meanwhile, FDR pursued measures to check Japan’s 
expansion and perhaps provoke it into a conflict. Japan had been 
waging war in China since the 1931 Manchuria crisis and had 
launched an invasion to conquer the whole nation in 1937. 
Japanese military and civilian leaders sought to create a 
“Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” that would supply the 
raw materials for the Japanese economy and the war in China.258 
In 1940, Japan had intensified its attacks in China and had 
moved into Indochina. In September 1940, it entered into the 
Axis agreement with Germany and Italy.259 
Roosevelt launched a campaign of economic warfare, without 
reliance on legal authority. In July 1940, for example, FDR 
blocked aviation gasoline exports to Japan.260 Chiang Kai-shek 
had sent an urgent message to Roosevelt that without more aid, 
the Nationalist Chinese resistance to Japan would fail.261 FDR 
responded by banning the export of iron and steel to Japan. In 
November, he sent $100 million and 100 warplanes to the 
Chinese Nationalist government, and in the Spring he authorized 
volunteers—Colonel Chennault’s Flying Tigers—to fly fighters 
for China.262 FDR had never found China and Japan to be at war 
under the 1939 Neutrality Act, so he had no statutory authority 
to impose the materials embargo on Japan or to send money and 
arms to China.263 Roosevelt simply undertook the actions as 
president in order to protect the national security. 
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Japan’s expansion south toward Indochina and Thailand 
increased the potential for conflict. On July 26, 1941, FDR 
ordered a freeze of Japanese assets in the United States, reduced 
U.S. oil exports to pre-war levels, and prohibited the sale 
of high-octane aircraft gasoline to Japan.264 By mistake, 
administrators executed a complete oil embargo against Japan, 
which FDR did nothing to correct. FDR opened negotiations to 
reach a settlement with the Japanese government, though he 
knew because of American code-breaking success that Tokyo was, 
at the least, considering an attack on American, British, and 
Dutch possessions in Asia. 
Some historians believe that FDR’s goal was to hold off 
Japan while resources could be devoted against the dire 
challenge in Europe—a view held by many of his military and 
civilian advisors. Marc Trachtenberg, however, has convincingly 
argued that FDR deliberately painted the Japanese into a 
corner.265 In the course of negotiations, Roosevelt demanded that 
Tokyo end its war in China in exchange for a resumption of U.S. 
oil and steel exports, yet FDR and his advisors knew that Japan 
would not willingly give up its territorial gains in China. “[T]he 
United States had been waging preventive economic warfare 
against Imperial Japan for at least 18 months prior to Pearl 
Harbor,” Colin Gray writes.266 “U.S. measures of economic 
blockade left Japan with no alternative to war consistent with its 
sense of national honor. The oil embargo eventually would 
literally immobilize the Japanese Navy. So Washington 
confronted Tokyo with the unenviable choice between de facto 
complete political surrender of its ambitions in China, or war.”267 
As FDR squeezed Japan, he expanded political and military 
assistance to the British. On August 9th, he met Churchill in 
Placentia Bay, off Newfoundland, where the two leaders issued 
the Atlantic Charter.268 It declared Anglo-American principles in 
the war to be: no Anglo-American aggrandizement, opposition to 
undemocratic changes in territory, self-government for all 
peoples, equal access to trade and natural resources, 
international economic cooperation, a guarantee of security and 
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freedom to all nations, freedom of the seas, disarmament of 
aggressors and reduction in armaments, and plans for a 
collective system of international security.269 During the 
discussions, FDR made clear to Churchill his desire to bring the 
United States into the war by forcing an incident with 
Germany,270 and set out to make his wish come true by ordering 
full naval escorts for British convoys between the United States 
and Iceland, which put the Germans in the position of either 
firing on U.S. warships or conceding the Battle of the Atlantic. 
Without input from Congress, FDR had joined together the fates 
of the United States and Britain.  
An undeclared shooting war soon broke out. On September 
4th, a German submarine fired on the destroyer USS Greer, 
which FDR used to publicly justify “shoot-on-sight” orders for 
naval escorts in the Atlantic.271 Only later did Congress learn 
that the Greer had been hunting the submarine with British 
airplanes and had dropped depth charges on the Germans. FDR 
declared the Nazis to be the equivalent of modern-day pirates 
and compared German subs and commerce raiders to 
“rattlesnakes of the Atlantic.”272 As he put it, “when you see a 
rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck 
before you crush him.”273  
FDR won broad support for the Navy’s new rules of 
engagement in the Atlantic, but at the price of deliberately 
deceiving the public about the facts.274 He followed with an 
October speech claiming that captured Nazi plans envisioned the 
division of North and South America into five dependent states 
and the abolition of the freedom of religion.275 The shooting war 
led to German submarine attacks on two American destroyers, 
the USS Kearny and the USS Reuben James, with the deaths of 
eleven and 115 sailors, respectively.276 FDR responded by seeking 
amendment of the neutrality laws to allow merchantmen to arm 
and carry goods directly to British ports. 
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The changes passed Congress by small majorities because 
about seventy percent of the public told pollsters they opposed 
American entry into the war.277 FDR concluded that the public, 
influenced by the memory of the way Wilson had led the country 
into World War I, would not rally behind a war waged in 
response to these isolated incidents. Rising tensions with Japan, 
however, provided other opportunities. After the Atlantic 
Conference, FDR informed the Japanese ambassador that any 
further expansion in Southeast Asia would force him to take any 
and all measures necessary “toward insuring the safety and 
security of the United States.”278 FDR’s attempts at a negotiated 
solution were, perhaps, less than genuine. He offered to 
undertake formal negotiations with Prince Konoye, the Japanese 
Prime Minister, only if Japan suspended its “expansionist 
activities” and openly declared its intentions in the Pacific.279 
FDR asked that Japan terminate the Axis alliance, withdraw 
from China, and open up its trading system. He consciously 
demanded terms he knew that the Japanese were unlikely 
to accept. 
Japanese cabinet meetings on September 3rd through 6th 
concluded that unless the government reached a settlement with 
the United States by October, its military would attack 
American, British, and Dutch possessions in Asia.280 Tokyo 
decided its terms must include the freedom to conclude matters 
in China, an end to Anglo-American military action in the 
Pacific, and secure access to raw materials for the economy. FDR 
refused to negotiate on these conditions and instead ordered the 
reinforcement of the Philippines. By October 15th, FDR and his 
advisors believed that they needed more “diplomatic fencing” to 
create the image “that Japan was put into the wrong and made 
the first bad move—overt move.”281  
Thanks to electronic intercepts of Japanese communications, 
FDR knew that the Japanese would attack if no settlement were 
reached, and he tried to string out negotiations to give the armed 
forces time to strengthen its position in the Philippines. On 
November 24, 1941, FDR discussed with his advisors the chances 
of a Japanese sneak attack and asked “how we should maneuver 
them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too 
much danger to ourselves.”282 He also told the British that he 
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would respond to any attack on their possessions in Asia. Still, 
FDR realized that without an enemy attack on the United States, 
his other measures would not convince the American people to 
support entry into World War II. 
On December 7, 1941, the Japanese solved FDR’s 
conundrum.283 No evidence supports the theories that FDR knew 
that Pearl Harbor was the target, nor that he willfully ignored 
the possibility of devastating losses to the Pacific Fleet. FDR did 
not consciously know about any specific attack on the United 
States—rather, he placed the Japanese in the position of 
choosing between war and giving up their imperial ambitions in 
China and the rest of the Pacific. The most that can be said is 
that if war were to come, FDR had tried for more than a year to 
maneuver the Axis powers into firing a first shot, while 
preparing the armed forces and American public for that 
eventuality. Pearl Harbor guaranteed the unity of the American 
people, just as Fort Sumter had eight decades before. As FDR 
told the American people the next day, December 7th was a “day 
which would live in infamy,” and he asked Congress for a 
declaration of war, which it promptly granted.284 
Hitler further obliged by declaring war on the United States 
three days later. FDR exercised foresighted leadership in 
recognizing the Axis threat to the United States and the free 
nations of the West. But faced with a recalcitrant Congress and a 
reluctant public, FDR had to use his constitutional powers to 
move the nation into a war that he knew, as perhaps no one else 
did, was in the country’s best interests. If he had faithfully 
obeyed the Neutrality Acts, American entry into the war might 
have been delayed by months, if not years. A president who 
viewed his constitutional authorities as narrowed to executing 
the will of Congress might well have lost World War II. 
III. WARTIME CIVIL LIBERTIES 
It is commonplace today to read the argument that war 
reduces civil liberties too much. We can gain a useful perspective 
on the question by examining Roosevelt’s wartime measures. 
FDR responded to the devastating Pearl Harbor attack with 
domestic policies, such as the use of military commissions, the 
internment of Japanese-Americans, and the widespread use of 
electronic surveillance. As in the Civil War, the federal courts 
deferred to the political branches until the war ended, and 
Congress went along with the president for the most part.  
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A. Military Commissions 
Military commissions are a form of tribunal used to try 
captured members of the enemy for violations of the laws of war. 
American generals have used them from the Revolutionary War 
through World War II, and, as we have seen, the Lincoln 
administration deployed them during the Civil War to try 
Confederate spies, irregular guerrillas, and sympathizers. 
Military commissions are neither created nor regulated by the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, which is enacted by Congress 
and governs courts-martial; instead, they were established by 
presidents as Commander-in-Chief and by military commanders 
in the field.285  
World War II witnessed the use of military commissions on a 
par with the Civil War, but primarily for the administration of 
postwar justice. While the Nuremburg trials were the most well 
known, military commissions heard charges of war crimes 
against many former German and Japanese leaders at the end of 
the war. But the first commission was set up well before those, 
more famous examples, to hear the case of “The Nazi Saboteurs.” 
In June 1942, eight German agents covertly landed in Long 
Island and Florida with plans to attack factories, transportation 
facilities, and utility plants.286 All had lived in the United States 
before the war, and two were American citizens. One of them 
turned informer; after initially dismissing his story, the FBI 
arrested the plotters and revealed their capture by the end of 
June.287 Members of Congress and the media demanded the 
death penalty, even though no statutory provision established 
capital punishment for non-U.S. citizens.288 
Roosevelt wanted a trial outside the civilian judicial system. 
On June 30th, he wrote to his Attorney General, Francis Biddle 
(Jackson having been elevated to the Supreme Court), supporting 
the idea of using military courts because “[t]he death penalty is 
called for by usage and by the extreme gravity of the war aim 
and the very existence of our American Government.”289 
Roosevelt already thought they were guilty, and the punishment 
was not in doubt: “Surely they are just as guilty as it is possible 
to be . . . and it seems to me that the death penalty is almost 
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obligatory.”290 Two days earlier, Biddle and Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson had worried that the plot was not far enough 
along to win a conviction with a significant sentence—perhaps 
two years at most. Stimson was surprised that Biddle was “quite 
ready to turn them over to a military court” and learned 
that Justice Felix Frankfurter also believed a military 
court preferable.291 
On June 30th, Biddle wrote to Roosevelt summarizing the 
advantages of a military commission.292 It would be speedier and 
easier to prove violations of the laws of war, and the death 
penalty would be available. Biddle also believed that using a 
military commission would prevent the defendants from seeking 
a writ of habeas corpus. “All the prisoners . . . can thus be denied 
access to our courts.”293 He did not commit to writing another 
important consideration: secrecy. According to Stimson, Biddle 
favored a military commission because the evidence would not 
become public, particularly that the Nazis had infiltrated U.S. 
lines with ease and had been captured only with the help of an 
informant.294 Biddle recommended that FDR issue executive 
orders establishing the commission, defining the crimes, 
appointing its members, and excluding judicial review.295 
On July 2, 1942, Roosevelt issued two executive orders.296 
The first created the commission and gave it the authority to try 
any “subjects, citizens, or residents of any nation at war with the 
United States,” who attempt to “enter the United States or any 
territory or possession thereof, through coastal or boundary 
defenses,” with an effort to “commit sabotage, espionage, hostile 
or warlike acts, or violations of the law or war.”297 The 
commission would try the defendants for violations of the laws of 
war, which mostly took the form of unwritten custom. FDR 
prohibited any appeals to the civilian courts, unless the Secretary 
of War and the Attorney General consented.298 His second order, 
in one paragraph, established the rules of procedure. The 
military judges were to hold a “full and fair trial” and could 
admit any evidence that would “have probative value to a 
 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. at 65–66. 
 292 Id. at 66. 
 293 Id. 
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. at 66–67. 
 296 Id. at 67. 
 297 Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 7, 1942). 
 298 See id.; see also FISHER, supra note 285, at 98–99. 
Do Not Delete 3/5/18 1:46 PM 
258 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:1 
reasonable man.”299 The concurrence of two-thirds of the judges 
was required for sentencing, and any appeals had to run directly 
to the President himself.300 
As structured by FDR, the commissions subjected the Nazi 
saboteurs to a form of justice very different from that normally 
applied in civilian courts. The most striking departure was the 
absence of a jury, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the 
Constitution. Neither civilian criminal procedure nor the normal 
rules of evidence applied, and FDR made no allowances for a 
right to legal counsel, a right to remain silent, or a right of 
appeal. Another important difference was that the laws of war, 
which at that time remained mostly unwritten, would define the 
crimes. Unlike the civilian system, which requires that the 
government prosecute defendants for crimes that are clearly 
defined and written, the saboteurs would be charged with war 
crimes upon which even legal experts would struggle to agree.  
FDR’s order was of uncertain constitutionality under the law 
of the day. At that time, the governing case was still Ex parte 
Milligan. Milligan held that the government had to use civilian 
courts when the defendant was not a member of the enemy 
armed forces and the courts were “open to hear criminal 
accusations and redress grievances.”301 FDR created military 
commissions to avoid Milligan, to charge the defendants with 
violations of the laws of war, and to preclude any form of judicial 
review. Military counsel for the Nazi saboteurs challenged the 
constitutionality of the trial on the ground that courts were open, 
the defendants were not in a war zone, violations of the laws of 
war were not subject to prosecution under federal law. Military 
commissions, they argued, violated the Articles of War enacted 
by Congress.302 
FDR was undeterred when the Supreme Court agreed to 
hear the defendants’ case. As the Justices gathered in conference 
before oral argument, Justice Roberts reported that Biddle was 
worried that FDR would order the execution of the saboteurs 
regardless of the Court’s decision. Chief Justice Stone, whose son 
was working on the defense team, said “[t]hat would be 
a dreadful thing.”303 While Stone did not recuse himself, 
Justice Murphy—who was in uniform as a member of the army 
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reserve—did.304 Justice Byrnes, who had been serving as an 
informal advisor to the administration, did not. Biddle himself 
argued the case and urged the Court to overrule Milligan, but 
after two days of oral argument, the Justices decided to uphold 
the military commission.305 The great pressure on the Court is 
reflected in its decision to deliver a brief per curiam opinion the 
day after oral argument, with an opinion to follow months later. 
Commission proceedings began the day after the Supreme 
Court issued its order. The commission convicted and sentenced 
the defendants to death in three days.306 Five days later, FDR 
approved the verdict but commuted the sentences of two 
defendants.307 Roosevelt’s two executive orders remained the only 
guidance for the commission on the rules of procedures and the 
definition of the substantive crimes. There was no written 
explanation, for example, of the elements of the violations of the 
laws of war, nor were procedures given, aside from the votes 
required for conviction and the admission of evidence. 
When the Supreme Court finally issued its opinion, it 
carefully distinguished Milligan.308 Chief Justice Stone’s 
unanimous opinion for the Court found that Milligan applied to a 
civilian who had never associated himself with the enemy.309 The 
Nazi saboteurs, by contrast, had clearly joined the German 
armed forces. Neither the Bill of Rights nor the separation of 
powers barred FDR from using military courts during wartime 
to try enemy combatants. Congressional creation of the courts 
martial system and the absence of any criminal provisions 
to punish violations of the laws of war presented no 
serious obstacle. Chief Justice Stone read the Article of War 
recognizing the concurrent jurisdiction of military commissions 
as congressional blessing for their existence.310 The Justices 
decided not to address the issue that had divided them 
behind the scenes—whether Congress could require the president 
to provide the saboteurs with any trial at all, civilian or 
military—because they did not read any congressional enactment 
as prohibiting military commissions.311 If the United States was at 
war, and it captured members of the enemy armed forces, it could 
try the prisoners for war crimes outside the civilian or court 
martial systems. 
 
 304 Id. 
 305 Id. at 70–71. 
 306 Id. at 71. 
 307 Id. at 72. 
 308 See id. at 73–75. 
 309 Id. at 72–73. 
 310 Id. at 73. 
 311 Id. at 72. 
Do Not Delete 3/5/18 1:46 PM 
260 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:1 
B. Detention 
In the wake of Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt ordered 
sweeping military detentions that, in absolute numbers, far 
eclipsed Lincoln’s policies in the Civil War. After the Japanese 
attack and the German and Italian declarations of war, FDR 
authorized the Departments of War and Justice to intern 
German, Japanese, and Italian citizens in the United States. In 
February 1942, for example, the government detained 
approximately 3000 Japanese aliens.312 Detention of the citizens 
of an enemy nation had long been a normal aspect of the rules of 
war, and was authorized by the Alien Enemies Act (on the books 
since 1798).313 That same month, FDR went even further and 
authorized the detention of American citizens suspected of 
disloyalty. On February 19, 1942, FDR signed Executive Order 
9066, allowing the Secretary of War to designate parts of the 
country as military zones “from which any or all persons may be 
excluded.”314 By the end of 1942, the government moved 110,000 
Japanese-Americans to ten internment camps because of the 
possibility that they might provide aid to the enemy.315 Recent 
historical work suggests that Roosevelt took a far more 
active role in the detention decision than has been 
commonly understood.316 
There was substantial disagreement within the military and 
the administration on the internments.317 General John DeWitt, 
commander of the Fourth Army on the West Coast, initially 
opposed the mass evacuations of Japanese-Americans, as did 
officials in the Justice Department and several prominent White 
House aides, but by late January 1942, thinking had changed.318 
A popular movement on the West Coast demanded removal of the 
Japanese-Americans to the nation’s interior. This sentiment 
gathered momentum as the United States suffered a string of 
military defeats in the Pacific. The precipitating factor in the 
eventual internment decision appears to be the release of the 
Roberts Commission report on the Pearl Harbor attacks.319 While 
the commission only briefly mentioned that some Japanese in the 
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Hawaiian Islands, along with Japanese consular officials, had 
provided intelligence on military installations before the attacks, 
the public response was tremendous. The Roberts Commission 
report “attracted national attention and transformed public 
opinion on Japanese Americans.”320 Newspapers, California 
political leaders, and military officials demanded that the 
Roosevelt administration intern Japanese-Americans out of fear 
of further sabotage and espionage.321 Some in the War 
Department discounted the effect of espionage on the West Coast, 
and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover dismissed claims of disloyalty. 
Cabinet members raised the issue twice with the President 
before the final executive order. Biddle met FDR for lunch in 
early February 1942 to express doubts about the need for 
internment. While FDR did not make a decision at that time, he 
concluded the lunch by saying he was “fully aware of the dreadful 
risk of Fifth Column retaliation in case of a raid.”322 A few days 
later, Stimson called Roosevelt after learning that General 
DeWitt would recommend removal of Japanese-Americans on the 
West Coast.323 News that Singapore had fallen arrived the 
day before Stimson’s call, making it unlikely that FDR would 
second-guess claims of military necessity. Nonetheless, 
Stimson—who had his own doubts about the necessity and 
legality of the evacuations—proposed three options: massive 
evacuation, evacuation from major cities, or evacuation from 
areas surrounding military facilities.324 Roosevelt responded that 
Stimson should do what he thought best, and that he would sign 
an executive order giving the War Department the authority to 
carry out the removals.325 DeWitt soon found the evacuations 
necessary on security grounds, and Stimson and Biddle agreed on 
a draft of the executive order based on Roosevelt’s constitutional 
authorities as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.326 It 
appears that FDR’s decision rested solely on the military’s claim 
of wartime necessity.  
Several scholars have observed that Roosevelt was not 
vigilant in protecting civil liberties, and in this case, according to 
one biographer, the decision was easy for him.327 FDR believed 
that the military “had primary direct responsibility for the 
achievement of war victory, the achievement of war victory had 
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top priority, and ‘victory’ had for him a single simple meaning” of 
defeating Germany and Japan; victory, for Roosevelt, “was 
prerequisite to all else.”328 There was no great outcry from liberal 
leaders, there was no cabinet meeting or forum for debate within 
the administration, and the Attorney General came to agree with 
the War Department that the measure was legal. Recent 
historical work argues that the internment decision did not arise 
solely because of misinformation about Japanese-Americans or 
the pressure of events early in the war.329 The internments 
happened, in part, because FDR was ready to believe the worst 
about the potential disloyalty of Japanese-Americans.330 
Presidential consultation with Congress did not improve 
national security decision-making. Both Congress and the Court 
approved FDR’s actions. In March 1942, Congress passed a bill 
establishing criminal penalties for those who refused to obey the 
evacuation orders.331 Support for the law was so broad that it was 
approved in both the House and Senate by voice vote with only a 
single speech, by Republican Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, 
in opposition. 
The Supreme Court did not directly address the 
constitutionality of the detentions until Korematsu v. United 
States, decided on December 18, 1944.332 According to the Court, 
the mass evacuation triggered “strict” scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause because it discriminated on the basis of race.333 
Nonetheless, the Court agreed that these wartime security 
measures advanced a compelling government interest, and the 
Court deferred to the military’s judgment of necessity. According 
to Justice Black’s 6–3 majority opinion, “[the court was] unable to 
conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress and the 
Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West 
Coast war area at the time they did.”334 While not disputing the 
deprivation of individual liberty involved, the majority 
recognized that “the military authorities, charged with the 
primary responsibility of defending our shores, concluded that 
curfew provided inadequate protection and ordered exclusion.”335 
As with an earlier case upholding a nighttime curfew on 
Japanese-Americans in the western military region, the Court 
concluded, “we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the 
 
 328 Id. 
 329  ROBINSON, supra note 316, at 118. 
 330 Id. 
 331 56 Stat. 173, 77 Cong. Ch. 191 (Mar. 21, 1942).  
 332 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 333 Id. at 216. 
 334 Id. at 217–18. 
 335 Id. at 218. 
Do Not Delete 3/5/18 1:46 PM 
2018] Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power 263 
military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal 
members of that population, whose number and strength could 
not be precisely and quickly ascertained.”336 
The Court’s majority stressed that the Constitution afforded 
leeway to the executive branch during time of emergency.337 
Justice Black agreed that while the government generally could 
not detain citizens based solely on their race, such motivation 
was not present in the instant case. The exclusion order was 
necessary, Black wrote, because “the properly constituted 
military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast,” and 
their judgment was that “the military urgency of the situation 
demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated 
from the West Coast temporarily[.]”338 Although it observed that 
Congress supported the military’s power “as inevitably it must” 
during wartime, the Court attached no special importance to 
the authorization.339  
The press of circumstances required deference to military 
judgment. “There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, 
the military authorities considered that the need for action was 
great, and time was short.”340 Perhaps most important, Justice 
Black concluded that decisions taken during the emergency itself 
had to be understood in light of the information known at the 
time. “We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective 
of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions 
were unjustified.”341 
Korematsu remains one of the most criticized decisions in 
American history, considered second only to Dred Scott on the list 
of the Court’s biggest mistakes. The three dissenters believed 
that the Constitution clearly protected Japanese-American 
citizens from what we today would call racial profiling. The 
government, Justice Roberts wrote, was “convicting a citizen as a 
punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a 
concentration camp, based on his ancestry, and solely because of 
his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty 
and good disposition towards the United States.”342 The 
dissenters did not challenge the proposition that “sudden danger” 
might require the suspension of a citizen’s right to free 
movement, or that the Court owed the military broad deference 
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during wartime, but that the chosen hypothetical did not 
represent the true facts of the case. Any “immediate, imminent, 
and impending” threat to public safety was absent.343 Justice 
Murphy wrote in dissent that “this forced exclusion was the 
result in good measure of [an] erroneous assumption of racial 
guilt rather than bona fide military necessity.”344 The dissenters 
pointed out that the government presented no reliable evidence 
that Japanese-Americans were generally disloyal or had done 
anything that made them a threat to the national defense. 
The exclusion order relied simply on unproven racial and 
sociological stereotypes. 
Justice Jackson used his dissent to harmonize the role of the 
executive and the courts during wartime. “It would be 
impracticable and dangerous idealism to expect or insist that 
each specific military command in an area of probable operations 
will conform to conventional tests of constitutionality.”345 For a 
Commander-in-Chief and the military, “the paramount 
consideration is that its measures be successful, rather than 
legal.”346 In words that echoed Lincoln and Jefferson, Jackson 
declared that the “armed services must protect a society, not 
merely its Constitution,” and observed that “defense measures 
will not, and often should not, be held within the limits that bind 
civil authority in peace.”347 That said, Jackson did not want to 
provide constitutional legitimacy to the exclusion order. There 
might be no limit to what military necessity would allow when 
courts are institutionally incapable of second-guessing the 
decisions of military authorities. “But if we cannot confine 
military expedients by the Constitution, neither would I distort 
the Constitution to approve all that the military may deem 
expedient.”348 Upholding the Japanese-American internment 
would create a dangerous precedent for the future. “The principle 
then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any 
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent 
need.”349 A one-time-only action is only an “incident,” but once 
upheld by the Court, it becomes “the doctrine of the 
Constitution.”350 In a solution many have found unsatisfying, 
Jackson wanted the Court neither to bless nor block the 
military’s enforcement of the exclusion. 
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Historical research has revealed that some government 
officials doubted whether any real security threat justified the 
exclusion order. Nonetheless, the Justice Department chose in 
Korematsu to assert that military authorities believed the 
evacuations necessary because of an alleged threat against the 
West Coast. A companion case, Ex parte Endo, however, found 
that the government could not detain a Japanese-American 
citizen whom the government had conceded was “loyal and 
law-abiding.”351 To this day, the debate over the necessity of the 
measures continues, but regardless of which side one falls on in 
that debate, it seems clear that the internment of the Japanese-
Americans in Korematsu represents a far more serious 
infringement of civil liberties than that which occurred in the 
Civil War. The first and most obvious difference is one of 
magnitude. FDR interned—without trial—about 110,000 
Japanese-Americans on suspicion of disloyalty to the United 
States.352 Lincoln ordered the detention of about 12,600.353 
The second difference is one of justification. FDR ordered the 
detention of the Japanese-Americans not because any had been 
found to be enemy combatants. They were interned because of 
their potential threat due to loyalty to an enemy nation imputed 
from their ethnic ancestry. FDR could have pursued a narrower 
policy that detained individuals based on their individual ties to 
a nation with which the United States was at war. The citizens of 
Japan, Germany, and Italy could be interned as a matter of 
course, and anyone fighting or working for the enemy, regardless 
of citizenship, could be detained. With regard to aliens, FDR 
could have relied upon the Alien Enemies Act to detain natives or 
citizens of a hostile nation during wartime.354 FDR’s internment 
policy did neither—instead, it presumed disloyalty, sweeping 
in 110,000 American’s of Japanese ancestry based solely on 
their ethnicity.  
C. Electronic Surveillance 
Roosevelt has been described by one historian as 
the president most interested in covert activity other than 
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Washington, who personally managed spies and directed the 
interception of British communications. During World War I, 
Roosevelt had served as assistant secretary of the Navy, with 
responsibility for intelligence. During World War II, his 
interest in covert operations led to the establishment of the 
Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.355 
Less well known are Roosevelt’s actions with regard to the 
interception of electronic communications. The Administration 
initially had not engaged in any wiretapping for national 
security purposes, as Attorney General Jackson believed that 
electronic surveillance without a warrant violated the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934.356 In March 1940, he issued 
an order prohibiting the FBI from intercepting electronic 
communications without a warrant. As Europe plunged into war, 
however, J. Edgar Hoover grew increasingly concerned about the 
possibility of Axis spies within the United States. Aware of 
Jackson’s order, Hoover went to Treasury Secretary Henry 
Morgenthau and asked him to speak to Roosevelt to authorize 
the interception of the communications of potential foreign 
agents who might sympathize with Germany.357 
Roosevelt had long been concerned with the potential threat 
of a “fifth column” inside the United States. The spectacular 1916 
sabotage of an American munitions plant remained vivid in his 
memory. As early as 1936, Roosevelt authorized the FBI to 
investigate “subversive activities in this country, including 
communism and fascism.”358 When World War II broke out, 
Roosevelt ordered the Bureau to “take charge of investigative 
work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of 
neutrality regulations,” and commanded state and local law 
enforcement officers to “promptly turn over” to the FBI any 
information “relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, 
subversive activities and violations of the neutrality laws.”359 
What “subversive activities” meant was left undefined. 
France’s collapse in May 1940 had a profound effect. At the 
time, Germany’s smashing victory seemed inexplicable as a feat 
of arms alone, lending credence to the theory that collaborators 
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and spies were also responsible. Roosevelt increasingly spoke of 
his concern that the United States, too, might suffer from Axis 
sympathizers or covert agents’ intent on undermining its war 
preparations. Even before Hoover came to make his request, FDR 
had encouraged amateur surveillance efforts. His friend, 
publisher, and real estate developer, Vincent Astor, had set up a 
private group he had called “the Room,” which included leading 
figures in New York City.360 As a director of the Western Union 
Telegraph Company, Astor ordered the covert interception of 
telegrams.361 He and his friends also arranged for the monitoring 
of radio transmissions in New York. Using its connections, the 
group gathered the private banking records of companies 
connected to foreign nations to determine whether they were 
supporting espionage within the United States.362 While there is 
no direct record of a presidential order authorizing this 
surveillance, historical evidence suggests that the group was 
acting in response to a request by Roosevelt.363 
Given his suspicions, Roosevelt quickly agreed with 
Morgenthau and Hoover that the wiretapping of suspected Axis 
agents or collaborators was necessary to protect national 
security. The next day, he issued a memorandum to Jackson to 
allow the FBI to wiretap individuals who posed a potential threat 
to the national security.364 After Pearl Harbor, FDR released the 
handbrake and authorized the interception of all international 
communications. Even though some Justices had criticized 
wiretapping, the Court held in 1928 in Olmstead v. United 
States, that the Fourth Amendment did not require a warrant to 
intercept electronic communications.365 It would not be until 
1967, in Katz v. United States, that the Supreme Court would 
hold that electronic communications were entitled to Fourth 
Amendment privacy protections.366 
Congress, however, appeared to have prohibited the 
interception of electronic communications in the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934. It declared that “no person” who 
receives or transmits “any interstate or foreign communication 
by wire or radio” can “divulge or publish” its contents except 
through “authorized channels of transmission” or to the 
recipient.367 In United States v. Nardone, decided in 1937, the 
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Supreme Court interpreted this language to prohibit wiretapping 
by the government as well as by private individuals.368 In 
a second Nardone case, the Court made clear that the 
government could not introduce in court any evidence gathered 
from wiretapping.369 
FDR recognized that his wiretapping order of May 1940 
violated the text of the statute, or at least the Supreme Court’s 
reading of it, but the President claimed that the Supreme Court 
could not have intended “any dictum in the particular case which 
it decided to apply to grave matters involving the defense of the 
nation.”370 Administration supporters in Congress introduced 
legislation to legalize wiretapping, but the House rejected the bill 
154–147.371 FDR continued the interception program throughout 
the war despite the Federal Communications Act and Nardone. 
FDR’s pre-war interception order applied to anyone “suspected of 
subversive activities” against the U.S. government, which 
included individuals who might be sympathetic to, or even 
working for, Germany and Japan.372 At that time, however, the 
United States was not yet at war. While FDR wanted the FBI to 
limit the interceptions to the calls of aliens, his order did not 
exclude citizens. Most importantly, it was not limited only to 
international calls or telegrams, but included communications 
that took place wholly within the United States. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
War and emergency demand that presidents exercise their 
constitutional powers far more broadly than in peacetime. That 
was never more true than under President Franklin Roosevelt. 
FDR tackled the Great Depression by treating it as a domestic 
emergency that called for the centralization of power in the 
federal government and the presidency. But he could not act 
alone, because the Constitution gives Congress the authority to 
regulate the economy and create the federal agencies. Under 
Roosevelt’s direction, Congress enacted sweeping legislation 
vesting almost complete power over industry and agriculture in 
the executive branch, which repeatedly sought to centralize 
power over the plethora of New Deal agencies in the presidency. 
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Roosevelt responded to the looming threat of fascism by 
bringing the United States into World War II, and he made all 
the significant decisions of foreign and domestic policy once the 
war began. Historians rarely, if ever, mention any role for 
Congress in the prosecution of the war against Germany and 
Japan, aside from the provision of money and arms. It was the 
President, for example, who decided that the United States 
would allocate its resources to seek victory in Europe first, and 
Roosevelt alone who declared that the Allies would demand 
unconditional surrender as the only way to end the war.  
FDR, not Congress, made the critical decisions about the 
shape of the postwar world. He wanted a world policed by four 
major countries: the United States, Great Britain, China, and the 
Soviet Union. He agreed with Great Britain and the Soviet Union 
to divide Germany—the “German question” was the fundamental 
strategic problem at the root of both World Wars. At Yalta, FDR 
agreed that the Soviet Union would control a sphere of influence 
extending over Eastern Europe, and in return, those nations 
would be allowed to hold democratic elections.  
While some believe that Stalin had hoodwinked him, FDR 
may have recognized the reality of the balance of power in 
Europe after the war. He may have hoped that his 
reasonableness in agreeing to Stalin’s demands would win, in 
exchange, Soviet support of the United Nations. Roosevelt also 
demanded that Britain and France give up their colonies. FDR 
wanted to forestall a return to both the isolationism and the 
international disorder of the interwar period. Historians argue 
today whether Roosevelt truly believed in collective security, or 
whether he was a realist who accepted the balance of power at 
the end of World War II. Either way, it was the President who 
took the initiative to set the policy, although it was one where he 
could not act alone. Without the Senate’s approval, the United 
Nations would have gone the way of the League of Nations. 
Too often, we focus on mistakes of commission—a 
decision to go to war gone bad, or a law that has unintended 
consequences—known as Type I errors. FDR showed that the 
presidency may be far more effective than the other branches in 
preventing a failure to take action—errors of omission, or Type II 
errors. Left to its own devices, Congress would have blocked aid 
to the Allies and delayed American entry into World War II by 
several months, if not years. This may be a result of the internal 
structure of Congress, which suffers from, at times crippling, 
collective action problems. The passage of legislation through 
both Houses with many members is fraught with such difficulty 
that the Constitution can be understood to favor inaction and, 
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therefore, maintenance of the status quo. The status quo may be 
best for a nation when it enjoys peace and prosperity, where 
threats come more often from ill-advised efforts at reform or 
revolutionary change. But maintaining the status quo may harm 
the nation when long-term threats are approaching, or 
unanticipated opportunities present themselves and must be 
seized rapidly before vanishing. 
In the area of domestic affairs, whether the New Deal or 
internal security programs, Roosevelt worked hand-in-hand with 
Congress. He had to: the Great Depression’s economic nature 
brought it squarely within the enumerated powers of Congress. 
Nevertheless, the emergency of the Depression illuminated the 
natural advantages of presidential leadership in the legislative 
process. A complex economy beset by a mysterious, but 
dangerous, ailment required administrative expertise for a cure, 
and Congress willingly cooperated by transferring massive 
legislative authority to the agencies.  
FDR deserves praised for trying every reasonable idea, 
including this transformation of executive-legislative relations, to 
reverse the sickening drop in economic activity. Crucially, 
neither he, nor anyone else, affirmatively knew how to end the 
Depression. Only now do we know that the New Deal, combined 
with the Federal Reserve’s tight monetary policy and the 
government’s restrictive fiscal policies, prolonged the Great 
Depression itself. Rather, it was World War II, not the New Deal, 
which ended the persistent unemployment levels of the 1930s. 
When the smoke cleared in 1945, the New Deal’s true legacy 
endured in the form of bloated, independent bureaucracies that 
future presidents would struggle to control. Plainly, presidential 
cooperation with Congress provides no guarantee of success, and, 
in fact, can prove quite malignant. 
Throughout FDR’s astounding presidency, a theme unites 
both his success in foreign policy and the appearance of such in 
domestic policy. FDR believed deeply in the independence of the 
presidency and a vigorous use of its constitutional authorities. He 
did not shrink from constitutional confrontations with the other 
branches. To pursue the policies he believed to be in the national 
interest such confrontation was often required. He openly 
disagreed with the Supreme Court’s limitations on the New Deal 
and publicly sought to manipulate its membership. He pushed 
his powers as Commander-in-Chief beyond their perceived limits, 
refusing to abide by the spirit, and sometimes the letter, of the 
Neutrality Acts in order to involve the United States in a war 
that neither Congress nor a clear majority of Americans favored. 
FDR correctly judged the threat to the nation’s existence posed 
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by the rise of fascism. The nation and the world are better off 
today because he pushed a reluctant nation into war. His broad 
understanding of his executive powers created the foundation for 
policies that secured freedom in the twentieth century. 
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